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This research explores the concept of orthodoxy and heresy in an Islamic 
context during the late Umayyad period, by investigating two early Islamic heretics, 
al-Harith ibn Surayj and Jahm ibn Safwan. The goal is to demonstrate the 
heterodoxical nature of Islam in the early Umayyad period, in contrast to Western 
Christian model, which more easily delineates between heretic and believer. The role 
of the caliphate and decline of the Umayyad administration inform the circumstances 
of the heretics and their condemnation in this period. The case studies are informed 
by al-Tabari’s Tārīkh and al-Baladhuri’s Ansāb al-Ashrāf, and illuminate the difficult 
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The topic of this thesis is heresy and heterodoxy in the late Umayyad 
period (112-122/730-740s), and it argues that early Islam was a heterodoxical 
system, wherein there were multiple forms of Islam that were permissible, 
encompassing multiple forms of belief and practice. Al-Harith ibn Surayj 
(d.127/745) and Jahm ibn Safwan (d.127/745 or 134/751, depending on the 
source) are two accused heretics, active within Khurasan, who when taken 
with relevant theories on heresy, demonstrate the heterodoxical nature of 
Islam in this early period. 
This study covers the late Umayyad period through the third fitna (ca. 
125-133/743-750), which began after the Caliph Hisham’s long and stable 
reign from 723-743. Judd asserts that Hisham’s stable and efficient 
administration is demonstrated by his ability to put forth a religious agenda, 
through the persecution and execution of heretics. The third fitna began when 
Hisham’s successor, Walid II (r. 125-126/743-744), was assassinated. 
Attempts to restore the stability of the caliphate occurred under Yazid III (r. 
126/744), Ibrahim (r. 126/744), and especially Marwan II (r. 126-133/744-
750), but the Abbasid revolutionaries were able to take advantage of the 




  First, I would like to say a few words about why and how I came to 
choose this topic. I have always been interested in the theological aspects of 
Islam and the issues of religious doctrine. One of my papers as an 
undergraduate focused on the Mu‘tazila, a religious movement during the 
Abbasid Empire, whose adherents believed in utilizing human reason to 
understand God and the createdness of the Qur’an. At the University of 
Maryland, I have encountered a number of related topics, which ultimately led 
me to discuss heresy. In my first semester, I encountered the topic of the 
Qadariyya, a group that believed in free will as opposed to predestination. I 
began to get interested exploring their similarities and differences with the 
Mu‘tazila and other religious groups.  Later that same class I read Fred 
Donner’s book Muhammad and the Believers, which was about the slow 
crystallization of Muslim identity in the course of the second fitna (ca. 61-
73/680-692), best exemplified by the erection of the Dome of the Rock by 
‘Abd al-Malik. I eventually decided to focus on the much- neglected period of 
the third fitna (ca. 126-133/743-750), and slowly the topic of religious identity 
and heresy during the third fitna began to develop.  
My research began with the theory chapter, which is now chapter two, 
in which I first researched the concept of heresy within the Western Christian 




as well as compiled a list of Arabic terms, expressing the concept of heresy, 
as it is traditionally understood in the Christian context.  The terms I focused 
on in this study were nāfiq, mubtada‘ and kāfir.  I collected these terms from 
Bernard Lewis’ article on heresy and Amir-Moezzi’s Encyclopedia of Qur’an 
entry on heresy. For theories of heresy, I utilized Bernard Lewis and John 
Wansbrough’s theories as starting points. Lewis’ theory was too relativistic to 
be useful, as it claimed that heresies occur in the face of every variety of 
Islamic caliphate. Wansbrough’s theory claimed two sects battled for 
legitimacy and the position of orthodoxy, but I did not find this theory to be 
relevant in this case study. Ultimately, I found Josef van Ess’ most recent 
theory concerning the criteria of a Muslim/heretic to be superior. It also 
coincided nicely with Donner’s theory of Islamic identity, which can also be 
interpreted as a claim for Umayyad orthodoxy.  
Chapter 3 discusses my primary resources, which developed over time, as 
my case studies were slowly emerging and evolving. This thesis begins with a 
discussion and contexualization of the sources available during this period, 
and inevitably with a discussion of al-Tabari’s (d. 311/923) chronicle. The fact 
that he wrote more than 150 years after the third fitna, suggests that his 
accounts reflect an Abbasid memory of early Islam, rather than a 




give me a lot of information, I also knew that he could not be taken as the sole 
primary source. I knew his recollection of events should be confronted by 
another historian of his time or other primary sources. It became clear I 
should utilize al-Baladhuri (d. 279/892) after reading Judd’s unpublished 
dissertation on the third fitna, because al-Baladhuri focuses on the religious 
while al-Tabari emphasizes the tribal dimensions of the period. Now while al-
Tabari is ordered chronologically, al-Baladhuri’s work is organized by person, 
which makes it a difficult source to navigate. This made comparing al-
Baladhuri and al-Tabari difficult, as relevant passages could still be hidden 
somewhere within Ansāb al-Ashrāf. The other primary sources became 
important when I finally focused on my case study. These include the letter of 
Marwan II’s secretary by ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Katib (d.132/750), who was a 
major player in the third fitna; a narrative source in Persian focusing on the 
Eastern part of the Empire and thus directly relevant for the events of 
Khurasan, the Fihrist (a bio-bibliography composed by Muhammad ibn Ishaq 
al-Nadim in 987-988, which offers rich material on heresiography);  and non-
Muslim sources that provide different perspectives on the late Umayyad 
period. Among these sources, ‘Abd al-Hamid’s letter was extremely helpful in 
demonstrating the perspective of the Umayyad administration, and the caliphs 




Harith is considered a heretic (kāfir), despite the caliph’s confusion 
concerning the events in Khurasan.  
The first chapter was also written concurrently with the case studies as 
important specifics concerning al-Harith and Jahm became relevant to their 
study and needed specific contextualization. The establishment of an 
orthodoxy, which is also covered in the second chapter, is also significant as 
it contextualizes the atmosphere of a heterodoxical Islamic system, such as 
‘Abd al-Malik’s  (r. 65-86/685-705) acceptance of Hasan al-Basri’s (d. 
109/728) divergent beliefs.  The organization of the tribal system, an overview 
of the third fitna, and a brief overview of some religious movements during 
that period add much-needed context to the case studies, found in chapter 4.  
Therefore, after accumulating the Arabic terms for heretic, I began 
rereading the primary source material, with an eye for someone considered to 
be a heretic. I wanted to try to find a heretic who was not part of the Shi‘a or 
Khawārij, because I felt it would be difficult to separate the doctrinal 
knowledge from later works, once religious identities solidified around a 
canonical body of texts. Instead, I hoped to find an isolated individual with his 
own distinct religious program. When I found al-Harith, a rebel from the 
Tamīmī tribe living in Khurasan, I was uncertain at first about whether his 




that he was a heretic and his own religious rhetoric, I became convinced he 
was a perfect case study to understand who typified a heretic during this time.  
Incidentally, Jahm ibn Safwan, the secretary of al-Harith and student of 
renowned heretic Ja’d ibn Dirham (d.118/736), was mentioned during al-
Tabari’s narrative, and while initially I was only planning on mentioning him 
briefly, he became my second case study. Had time permitted, a case study 
on him and his religious beliefs would have comprised a fifth chapter. I would 
have liked to have been more detailed about his religious beliefs and have 
included a separate appendix with a translated excerpt from al-Baladhuri 
about Jahm. 
When examining both al-Harith and Jahm, I first noticed that both were 
labeled heretics, albeit by different authors. Associated with that, they were 
also heretics for very different reasons, especially when one looks at the 
different terminology used for them. Al-Tabari had labeled al-Harith a 
hypocrite and an associationist, as exemplified by the last lines of the poem 
found in the appendix. Al-Baladhuri labeled Jahm an innovator (mubtada‘). 
Both of these men were considered heretics by later historians. However, 
since it is not unheard of to use these slurs to defame an enemy, these claims 
needed to be investigated further.  In an effort to investigate further, I looked 




condemning them. The reasons provided by al-Tabari concerning  al-Harith 
seemed incidental, with associations with non-believers and his rebellion. The 
reference to al-Harith’s religious program provided no details. But Jahm’s 
religious beliefs are much more documented. His belief that knowledge of 
God could not be known (completely opposite the beliefs of the Mu‘tazila) as 
well as the createdness of the Qur’an, logically makes him open to logical 
questions regarding his belief in Muhammad as the seal of the prophets and 
the formation of the Qur’an.  
When utilizing the case studies and the theories on heresy together, I 
determined that van Ess’ theory making the Qur’an and the Prophet 
Muhammad the two criteria of a Muslim, a satisfactory approach.  Van Ess 
provided real and practical criteria, particularly for this period to the question, 
by which to determine those of the Islamic religion and those who rejected, or 
manipulated it.  Al-Harith and Jahm did represent an opposition to the ruling 
authority or orthodoxy, but al-Harith’s difference in religious program seems 
similar enough to the orthodoxy and ruling authority that he represents a 
heterodoxical sect of Islam. Meanwhile, in order to determine if Jahm was a 
heretic within the Islamic heterodoxical system, Jahm’s religious program 
requires more study to understand whether he rejects the position of the 




Ultimately, I see my research being a synthesis of Judd’s dissertation, 
“The Third Fitna: Orthodoxy, Heresy and Coercion in Late Umayyad History” 
his article on Ghaylan al-Dimashqi (d. 104/723) and van Ess’ most recent 
works on heterodoxy and heresy. I have expanded on the work of Judd by 
researching the life of a heretic (specifically one found on the periphery of the 
Umayyad Empire, as opposed to Syria), instead of simply his interaction with 
the Umayyad administration, particularly one found in the periphery of the 
Umayyad Empire, as opposed to those in Syria.  I also feel that my study of 
al-Harith fits with Judd’s article on Ghaylan al-Dimashqi (d. 104/723) and 
Sean Anthony’s work on al-Harith ibn Sa’id al-Kadhdhab (d. 78/698). With 
regard to my case studies, my work also speaks to the work of al-Qadi, who 
has published numerous works about the circumstances of al-Harith’s 
rebellion, though not focusing on al-Harith himself.  
With more time, I think this thesis could be expanded by more research 
on the tribal system and tribal interactions in Khurasan, a peripheral region of 
the Umayyad Empire. This could better contextualize al-Harith’s revolt and his 
supporters, thereby providing information on their goals and belief system. 
Consequently, this kind of contextualization could further support al-Qadi’s 
assertion that ‘Abd al-Hamid’s letter references al-Harith and his rebellion, not 




that an expanded study could benefit from detailed discussions of specific 
religious doctrines, such as qadar (free will) and jabr, (predestination), and 
their association with different religious movements and groups. First steps in 
such a direction could be a formal translation of portions of al-Baladhuri’s 
Ansāb al-Ashrāf.  
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This thesis relies on al-Tabari’s Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, both the second 
Cairo edition and the English translated edition published by State University 
of New York Press. To distinguish between the two editions within the 
footnotes and bibliography, “al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O,” refers 
to the original second Cairo edition of Tārīkh, while “al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul 
wa al-Mulūk, T,” refers to the English translated volumes of Tārīkh, of which 
there are four: I, XXV, XXVI, and XXVII.  The volume utilized is specified 
within each footnote and the bibliography. The portion of the second Cairo 
edition of Tārīkh used in this paper is the seventh volume, ranging from the 
years 104- 146 hijrī and was found with the complete second Cairo edition 
and downloaded from www.archives.gov. This site was last accessed on 
March 20th, 2012.  
 
The following are abbreviations used in this paper: 
 
IJMES  International Journal of Middle East Studies 
AH   Anno Hijrī 
CE   Common Era 
sc.    Scilicet, meaning it is evident, clear, or plain 
 
This paper follows the transliteration system of the IJMES with some 
exceptions. Keeping with the IJMES transliteration guide, all technical terms 
and quoted passages shall be italicized and transliterated with diacritical 
marks; personal names and place names shall not be italicized nor will their 
transliterations include diacritics. This paper also is keeping in accordance 
with the IJMES Word List. However, names of political and religious parties 
will include diacritics, but will not be italicized. Titles of works within the paper 
shall be italicized and transliterated with diacritics. Lastly, any works and 
authors that appear in a foreign language shall be transliterated with diacritics 
in the footnotes and the bibliography, while diacritics shall be retained in 










Chapter 1: Historical Contextualization 
 
In the year 68/688, four banners (alwīyah) stood at ‘Arafāt: Ibn al-
Ḥanafiyyah with his companions (aṣḥāb) stood with the banner…; Ibn 
al-Zubayr stood with a banner at the present standing place of the 
Imām; then Ibn al-Ḥanafiyyah led his companions forward so that they 
stood opposite Ibn al-Zubayr; behind these two was Najdah the Ḥarūrī 
(Khārijī), and the banner of the Banū Umayyah was to the left of the 
two. The first banner to return from ‘Arafāt was that of Muḥammad ibn 
al-Ḥanafiyyah; he was followed by Najdah, then by the banner of the 
Banū Umayyah, and then by the banner of Ibn al-Zubayr, with the 
people (al-nās) following it.1 
 This excerpted passage describes the Hajj in Mecca in 68/688, where 
each of the major oppositional groups asserted religious and political 
legitimacy from the Muslim community, through their attendance and 
performance of the Hajj. The Umayyads, the Zubayrids, the Khawārij and the 
proto-Shi‘a, are also demonstrating the variation in religious beliefs and 
practices within the Islamic community, which were present in the second 
fitna (63-73/683-692). This example demonstrates the issue of multiple 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This is excerpted from al-Tabari’s Tārīkh. M.E. McMillan, The Meaning of 





religious beliefs and practices affirmed in the name of Islam, therefore 
requiring a discussion on the heterodoxical nature of Islam or an examination 
regarding which groups represent heretical beliefs and practices.  
 Judd is one of the few modern scholars who has analyzed the concept 
of heresy within the context of the third fitna (743-750), in his 1997 
dissertation titled “The Third Fitna: Orthodoxy, Heresy and Coercion in Late 
Umayyad History.”2 His dissertation outlines and analyzes the development 
and rise of heretical factions during the late Umayyad period, due to the 
lessening of caliphal tolerance toward divergent religious beliefs, beginning 
with the Caliph ‘Abd al-Malak (r. 66-86/685-705) and continuing through the 
third fitna.3 Judd’s dissertation outlines heresy and rebellion in the late 
Umayyad period solely from the perspective of how the Umayyad 
administration treated them in order to suppress religious divergence and 
promote unity, as the power of the caliph grew in relation to the caliph’s 
authority over doctrine and as the caliph’s tolerance for disagreement in these 
matters lessened. 4  However, this thesis concentrates wholly on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Stephen Clark Judd, “The Third Fitna: Orthodoxy, Heresy and Coercion in 
Late Umayyad History” (Dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1997). 
3 See Table 1 on page 3 for the list of Umayyad Caliphs in the Marwanid 
branch. Ibid., 227. 




narratives of two individuals accused of heresy and rebellion, to include their 
interactions with the Umayyad administration, when relevant. 
Table 1:Umayyad Caliphs ‒ Marwanid Branch 
 
Caliph Name Reign Dates in AH Reign Dates in CE 
Marwan I 64-65 684-685 
‘Abd al-Malik 65-86 685-705 
Walid I 86-96 705-715 
Sulayman 96-98 715-717 
‘Umar II 98-102 717-720 
Yazid II 102-106 720-724 
Hisham  106-125 723-743 
Walid II 125-126 743-744 
Yazid III 126 744 
Ibrahim 126 744 
Marwan II 126-133 744-750 
 
This thesis is an examination and analysis of divergent Islamic thought 
and practice in the early Islamic period, specifically during the late Umayyad 
period, encompassing the third fitna. Islamic beliefs and practices have 
developed throughout history, producing several differing beliefs and 
practices under the name “Islam.”  This fact is generally conceded today. 
However, Islam is sometimes referred to as a monolithic block during the 
early Islamic period. Evidence of differing beliefs and practices is 
demonstrated through nascent factions, such as the Shi‘a and the Khawārij, 
who were developing theological beliefs and practices that were considered 




viewed as a period of religious unity, there is a need to interrogate the 
unifying nature of the Islamic community in relation to those nascent groups 
that disagreed on particular religious thought and practices. The goal of this 
thesis is to characterize and clarify the concept of heresy as a framework 
within the Islamic community, and to contextualize a case study, in order to 
determine the religious and political nature of Islam at a time of civil and 
religious discord.  
This thesis is organized into four chapters, with this first chapter 
describing and analyzing the historical context of the late Umayyad period, 
including the third fitna. It will summarize the late Umayyad period, the third 
fitna up to the Abbasid revolution, in addition to factionalism and the religious 
movements occurring during that period. Early religious movements, such as 
the Murji‘a5, a group that insisted that judgment be deferred to God, and the 
Qadariyya6, a group that believed in free will, play significant roles within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The Murji’a will be discussed later in this chapter and also in chapter four; it 
was a religious movement that insisted on the accountability of caliphs and 
the deferment of judgment to God.W. Madelung, “Murdji’a,” Encyclopaedia of 
Islam (Brill Online, 2012). 
6 The Qadariyya was a religious movement that asserted the free will of 
people, thereby making the caliphs accountable to their subjects. The 
Qadariyya are discussed later in this chapter and also in chapter four. J. van 







case study of one specific heretic, found in chapter four: al-Harith (d.128/745), 
with his rebellion in Khurasan. In addition, the tribalism or factionalism 
occurring during this period greatly affects the historian, al-Tabari’s (d. 
311/923) perspective of the events. These factors, among others discussed 
later in this chapter, inform the background of the case studies and the 
Islamic framework on the whole.  
 The term “heresy” and related topics, such as orthodoxy, will be 
defined and examined within the Islamic context in the second chapter. Since 
the word “heresy” is derived from the Greek and adopted by Christianity, a 
necessary overview of its meaning in this context will also be discussed. 
Following its definition and origin, several theories developed regarding 
religious orthodoxy, heresy and heterodoxy, will be outlined and discussed. 
Each theory provides greater insight as to the extensive religious and 
historical context. These theories will provide a much needed structure and 
strength to the analysis of the case studies. Among the theorists included in 
this chapter are Lewis, Wansbrough, Asad, Van Ess and MacEoin. 
 The third chapter will outline and describe the primary resources used 
in this paper. It analyzes and reviews al-Tabari (d. 311/923), al-Baladhuri (d. 
279/892), ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Katib (d.132/750), Gardizi  (d. ca. 442/1050?) and 




religious authority and political legitimacy in early Islam. The purpose of this 
chapter is also to explain the transmission and authenticity of these sources 
in light of the gap in sources during this period.  For each primary source 
there will be a description and discussion of the transmission and 
preservation process, as well as their sources of the information, when 
provided, in order to address any question of forgery or false information.  
The information provided in the primary sources concerning al-Harith ibn 
Surayj and his secretary, Jahm ibn Safwan (d. 128/746), another heretic 
described and analyzed in chapter four, will serve as the foundation for the 
study of their heresies and the general concept of heresy within Islam.  
 The heart of the study lies in the fourth chapter, which analyzes the 
rebellion of al-Harith ibn Surayj and his secretary and theologian, Jahm ibn 
Safwan. The political and religious programs are described in the context of 
the late Umayyad period and third fitna. Both of these men were referred to 
as heretics in the primary sources, al-Harith within al-Tabari’s Tārīkh and 
Jahm within al-Baladhuri’s Ansāb al-Ashrāf.  The case study will describe the 
two men’s very different heresies, which will shed light on the label of 
“heretic,” in general.  
 The conclusion of this paper will draw from all chapters, thereby 




Khurasan, as well as apply their beliefs and actions to the theories of heresy 
and heterodoxy found in chapter one.  By applying the theories of religious 
heresy to the case study, a proper and appropriate framework for Islamic 
heresy or heterodoxy can be selected to best describe the historical and 
religious context of the late Umayyad period and possibly beyond.  
The importance of such a study lies in the issue of who is really a 
Muslim and who is an unbeliever. Who has the authority to decide and what 
are the qualifications for such a judgment? In the pre-modern era, these 
judgments usually fall under the authority of the political power. However, 
during the late Umayyad period there was a brief period when there was the 
eruption of multiple political (and religious) authorities in the Islamic world. 
This study is significant because it will preliminarily determine how best to 
categorize and classify the differing religious practices and thoughts relative 
to each other within the Islamic world. In addition, since the issue of religious 
and political unity continues, this study may provide a beneficial yet dated 
outline for religious divergences found within the Islamic world today. This 
paper represents one opinion in the discussion of different and opposing 








The caliphate was the only establishment with the religious and 
political authority to enforce any religious dogmas or practices; therefore, the 
third fitna and late Umayyad period, a time of weakening political and 
religious authority of the Umayyad Empire and political turmoil, present an 
interesting situation to view the concept of heresy and heterodoxy. Obviously 
the level that the caliphs were able to enforce these dogmas and practices 
lessened as the third fitna began and as political revolts increased. However, 
previous to this the Umayyad caliphs and administration had persecuted 
heretics; this will be described later in this chapter and briefly in the fourth 
chapter, along with a discussion of religious revolts throughout the empire. 
This chapter will provide an overview of the establishment of the Umayyad 
orthodoxy, the dynasty’s previous persecution of heretics associated with the 
development of several religious movements, the progression of tribal 
conflicts and rivalry at the culmination of the third fitna and Abbasid 
revolution. This historical contextualization will not only shed light on the case 
study concerning al-Harith ibn Surayj and Jahm ibn Safwan in the fourth 
chapter, but also examine the meaning of heresy in an Umayyad religious 





Political Orthodoxy & Religious Development 
As it will be discussed in chapter two, the debate concerning religious 
orthodoxy is pertinent to the discussion of who is a heretic and leads different 
scholars to different conclusions based on the nature of their own studies.  
Among the numerous scholars proposing theories concerning religious 
heresy, Bernard Lewis, Fred Donner, and Josef van Ess propose their own 
timelines for the establishment of orthodoxy. Lewis places orthodoxy at the 
time of the Prophet Muhammad, basically arguing that Muhammad and his 
successors or rāshidūn represented a legitimate ruling authority. The 
orthodoxy was lost under the Umayyads, following the Islamic tradition 
portraying them as secular kings, and then reestablished under the Abbasids 
as the “religion of the theologians.”7  This theory does not fit the case study, 
as the Umayyads did hold religious authority and were able to exercise 
accordingly in regards to heretics.8 Meanwhile, van Ess places the first 
orthodoxy under the Abbasids with the Mu‘tazila, due to the extension of their 
religious doctrines to multiple localities, but later concedes that a united 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Bernard Lewis, “Some Observations on the Significance of Heresy in the 
History of Islam,” Studia Islamica, no. 1 (1953): 48. 
8 Steven C. Judd, “Gaylan al-Dimashqi: The Isolation of a Heretic in Islamic 





religious practice of prayer and appreciation of the Qur’an occurred under 
‘Abd al-Malik.9  
Donner’s theory of religious orthodoxy suits the case study very well, 
without entering into the debate of heresy and heterodoxy. His theory of the 
crystallization of Islamic identity occurring under the rule of ‘Abd al-Malik 
demonstrates the Umayyads’ religious and political legitimation, which has 
been concealed in Abbasid literary sources, but perhaps religious orthodoxy 
had not yet solidified. Donner argues for the religious and political legitimacy 
of the Umayyads through ‘Abd al-Malik’s emphasis on Muhammad and the 
Qur’an, through the double shahada, proclaiming the position of Muhammad 
in the religion, building of the Dome of the Rock, including Qur’anic passages, 
and his coinage reform, which also contains religious rhetoric.10 To this end, 
the crystallization of an Islamic identity, developed by the Umayyads, made it 
possible for those who disagreed with the Umayyads to voice their 
displeasure in religious language.11 An example of this would be Hasan al-
Basri (d. 110/728) who was able to use the rhetoric and religious 
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crystallization to voice his critiques of the Umayyads and his own expression 
of Islamic identity.12 
Crone and Hinds also argue for the religious and political legitimacy of 
the Umayyads, although they do not mention whether the Umayyads 
represent the first of any kind of orthodoxy. Crone and Hinds’ argument is 
based on the usage of the title khalīfat Allāh, but also includes evidence of the 
Umayyad caliphs’ involvement in religious affairs.13 Therefore, despite the 
Islamic tradition’s bias against the Umayyads, which will be explained and 
rejected in chapter three, their rule represents one of religious and political 
orthodoxy, which provides the ability to label and execute heretics (though not 
in the same manner or to the same extent as occurs in Western Christian 
orthodoxy). Now that the argument regarding orthodoxy within the Umayyad 
Empire has been established, the historical context surrounding the tribal 
rivalries that led to the eruption of the third civil war will be examined. 
 
Tribal Factionalism in the Marwanid era 
Tribal factionalism and rivalries represent a significant, yet very 
complicated part leading up to the third fitna and within the case study. Tribal 
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structure was a significant part of the Islamic, and pre-Islamic world, because 
it represented kinship, and along with that, political ties and alliances. Non-
Arab converts participated in this tribal structure through the mawālī system, 
or clientage. Since the mawālī were not Arab and did not belong to an Arab 
tribe, they became associated with a tribe through a patron, which gained 
them some access to political power. 
While descent often dictated political alliances between the sub-tribes, 
there is some debate concerning whether in the years leading up to the third 
civil war they represented political parties, adhering to distinct political 
programs.14 Crone rejects this thesis, by demonstrating that adherence to a 
tribal confederation was mainly based on descent, not political viewpoint and 
that the Qays and the Yamanī tribal confederations never strictly adhered to 
the political programs that Shaban hypothesized.15 The nature of these tribes 
and the reasoning for their polarization exacerbated the problems in 
Khurasan, the region intersecting modern day Iran, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, 
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Turkmenistan and Tajikistan,16 causing the third fitna. Under the Sufyanids 
(41-61/661-680), the first ruling family branch of the Umayyads, the Qays held 
a particularly high position within the Umayyad administration, giving them 
access to political and financial power.17 This position afforded the Qays tribe, 
and those allied with them, the ability to affect the decisions of the caliph as 
well as receive stipends of 2000 dinars a year.18 A shift in tribal alliances 
occurred during the second fitna (61-73/680-692), wherein the Qays fought 
on the side of Ibn al-Zubayr, son of a companion of the Prophet who 
attempted to become the caliph after the Caliph Yazid’s death in 64/68319, 
and what is now known as the Yamanī fought for the Marwanids. With the 
emergence of the Marwanids (65-133/684-750) after the second civil war, the 
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Map of the Region: Syria, Iraq, Iran and Transoxania21
 
The modernization of the military system under Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik 
added its own pressures to the cooling feud between the two tribal 
confederations. With the professionalization of the military and the selection 
of qualified generals, rather than tribal affiliations to the caliph, stirring the 
selection of governors, the tribal rivalries begin to intensify.22 Generals were 
then allowed to choose sub-governors and candidates for other positions, for 
which they relied on their tribal affiliations. The polarization of the tribal 
confederations can therefore be demonstrated by the tribal identification of 
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the positions beneath the appointed governor. Therefore, despite the 
neutrality of the caliphs in their appointment of governors, the polarization of 
the tribes within the provinces was growing dire.  The dismissal of Qaysī and 
Yamanī governors also had dire consequences, since the position was highly 
valued for its power and financial gain. When they were dismissed from their 
office the money that was provided to them, through salary, but mostly 
through taxation and corruption was taken from them, usually accompanied 
by torture.23 
The tribal confederations and their feud played a significant role in the 
third fitna, which will be discussed in greater detail below. The Marwanids 
usually selected Qaysī governors to govern in Khurasan, because the 
inhabitants there were primarily Qaysī. Through unwise actions of Walid II (r. 
125-127/743-744) towards the Yamanīs, combined with their lack of 
administrative power in Khurasan, the Yamanīs, allied with Yazid III (r. 
127/744) assassinated Walid II and executed a military coup.24 The one-time 
combination of Yazid III’s religious program, which will be explained later in 
the chapter, with the tribal rivalry of the Qays and Yamanī produced at least 
part of the impetus for the third fitna.  
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Brief Overview of the Third Fitna (125-133 AH/743-750 CE) 
The traditional storyline of the third fitna includes the struggle for power 
among Marwanid princes after the death of the Caliph Hisham (r. 106-
125/724-743) in addition to the numerous revolts that complicate matters 
further. Often the third civil war is confused and conflated with the Abbasid 
revolution, which began during this same period. This paper will focus on the 
civil war leading up to and including portions of the Abbasid revolution, as it 
pertains to revolutions in Khurasan and the case study of al-Harith in 
particular.  
Upon the Caliph Hisham’s death, the caliphate was inherited by al-
Walid II ibn Yazid (r. 125-126743-744), his nephew, despite Hisham’s efforts 
to change the succession order and appoint his own son as caliph.25  Al-Walid 
II’s reign was short, roughly one year, and was riddled with impious behavior 
and political actions that garnered the ire and jealousy of other Marwanid 
princes as well as the heirs of Khalid al-Qasri (d. 126/743), whom al-Walid II 
tortured and killed.26  In addition to the political tensions between al-Walid and 
his kin, al-Walid II continued the policy of religious persecution of the 
Qadariyya, a religious group that believed in free will, a cause that was taken 
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up by Yazid III as a source of legitimization and support.27  Using the same 
rallying cry as the rebels in Khurasan for his revolt, Yazid III called for the 
accountability of the caliph to the people by calling the government to rule 
“according to the Qur’an and the sunna of the Prophet.”28 The Yamanīs 
supported Yazid and the plot to kill al-Walid II came to fruition in 744. Yazid III 
imprisoned the would be successors, al-Walid II’s adolescent sons and one 
other claimant to the throne, securing his position of caliph and the Yamanīs’ 
position over the Qays.29 Yazid III followed to the religious program of the 
Qadariyya for a short period before he reverted to the ideology of absolute 
authority of the caliph.30 However, he died less than a year later, after 
appointing his brother Ibrahim (r. 126/744) to inherit the caliphate. Marwan II 
ibn Muhammad (r. 126-132/744-750), formerly the distinguished governor of 
Armenia, had accepted the governorship of Mesopotamia under Yazid III. 
However, after his death he refused to support Ibrahim as caliph.31   Utilizing 
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the support from the Qays, Marwan II was victorious against Sulayman ibn 
Hisham (fl. 114-129/732-747), another claimant to the caliphate supported by 
the Yamanī tribal confederation, only after Sulayman had killed al-Walid’s 
sons. Marwan II entered Damascus and became caliph in 126/744, with 
Qaysī support.32 
Marwan II’s rule then continued the anti-Qadarī policies of previous 
caliphs and favored the Qays confederation for their support, with his transfer 
of the Umayyad capital to Harran, the center of Qays military power.33 The 
transfer of the capital further exacerbated the tribal rivalry and power balance 
between the Qays and Yamanī. This left Marwan II to contend with the 
numerous revolts, from the rebellions in Syria, to winning over support in Iraq, 
in addition to groups such as the ‘Alids and Khawārij.34 Despite the many 
disparate factions in Iraq (sometimes allying together), his efforts, with the 
help of his governors, to win Iraq were largely successful by 129/747.35 
However, the troubles and rebellions in Khurasan, as explained by the 
governor Nasr ibn Sayyar (d. 130/748), remained. By the time Marwan II had 
finished putting down the rebellions in Syria and Iraq, the situation in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
until Marwan II that there is another acknowledged caliph. Hawting, The First 
Dynasty of Islam The Umayyad Caliphate AD 661-750, 94‒97. 
32 Ibid., 97‒98. 
33 Ibid., 98. 
34 Ibid., 98‒99. 




Khurasan had advanced too far for him to solve.36 Abu Muslim (d. 137/755), 
an agent for the Abbasids, had arrived in Khurasan, spreading Abbasid 
propaganda in 128/745-46 and began his rebellion in 129/747.37 The debate 
regarding the ethnicity and factions associated with Abu Muslim’s rebellion 
generally belongs to the analysis of the Abbasid revolution. However, some 
aspects of this are relevant to the case study. Abu Muslim seems to have 
attracted the support of Arab tribes and their mawālī alike, from both the 
Yamanī and Qays confederations.38 In addition, Crone concludes that this 
movement included many groups advocating for a ruler from ahl al-bayt, 
meaning descendants of the Prophet such as the ‘Alids, elected by shūrā, 
which the Abbasids bypassed to eventually appoint themselves as rulers of 
this popular movement.39 These are the circumstances that allowed the 
Abbasids to seize political and religious legitimacy.  
There are many theories as to the cause of the third fitna and 
eventually the rise of the Abbasids. The tribal and political aspects of the era 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Ibid., 101‒102. 
37 Patricia Crone, “On the Meaning of the Abbasid Call to al-Riḍā,” in The 
Islamic World From Classical to Modern Times (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 
Inc., 1989), 105; R. Stephen Humphreys, Islamic History, Revised ed. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 118, 124. 
38 Amikan Elad, “The Ethnic Composition of the Abbasid Revolution: A 
Reevaluation of Some Recent Research,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and 
Islam 24 (2000): 275. 




definitely played a large role in the Umayyads instability and slow decline. 
Other theories on the third fitna involve these aspects, but add other factors, 
which could have contributed to the political and tribal conflicts. Welhausen 
developed the first basic theory of the third fitna, contending that the 
manipulative and power-hungry Umayyad princes caused discord among the 
tribes through alliances aimed at obtaining the caliphate. As Judd points out, 
Welhausen’s theory is typical of Umayyad history in general, emphasizing the 
secular kingship nature of the Umayyads, by focusing wholly on the narrative 
of the ruthless Marwanid princes.40 Shaban’s theory of political programs in 
the place of tribal alliance tried, but failed, to demonstrate that the tribes were 
actually accurate and consistent political parties, which caused the rivalry that 
led to the Umayyads’ collapse.41 Blankinship then theorized that the political 
program of expansion that had been pursued since the rise of Islam caused a 
financial and material strain on the caliphate, as well as the military’s 
dissatisfaction, which led to the unrest of the military structures and the re-
eruption of tribal rivalries.42 Hawting and Crone place the extra strain more 
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broadly on the administrative changes made within the Marwanid era, likely 
referring to the restructuring of the military and its impacts on the tribal 
confederations.43  Hawting’s, Crone’s and Blankinship’s theories adequately 
supplement the traditional theory of political and tribal rivalries, lending 
greater understanding of the precarious situation of the Umayyads.  
As will be discussed in the third chapter of the paper, the historian al-
Tabari’s (d. 311/923) approach and agenda in his Tārīkh reflected his 
contemporary atmosphere of political and religious fragmentation, thereby his 
depiction of the third fitna echoes his political reality, political fragmentation.  
Since the Umayyads were no longer in power, he had no need to integrate 
their perspectives into his writing; instead, he was able to utilize their history 
to demonstrate the ills that were affecting his contemporary society. As part of 
this agenda, al-Tabari identifies the groups struggling for power by their tribe 
and political claims, as opposed to any theological disputes among them.44   
Al-Baladhuri, on the other hand, places religious movements at the 
forefront of his narrative. This is demonstrated in chapter four below, through 
his focus on the theological discussion of Jahm ibn Safwan’s religious beliefs 
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and brief related narrative of al-Harith’s revolt.  This next portion of the 
present chapter will describe and analyze the religious movements of the 
period, how they interacted with the factors of the third fitna and also how 
they related to the Umayyads’ labeling and execution of heretics.  
 
Religious Movements during the Third Fitna 
While al-Tabari’s narration largely neglects religious movements, as 
explained previously, religious movements did play a role in the third fitna. 
Therefore, it becomes necessary to describe and analyze some of the 
religious doctrines that were developing and gaining traction at the time.  
Traditionally these religious sects have been conflated to political parties and 
used simply to denote group organization and mutual interests. Van Ess 
posits that the conflation of religion and politics is due to the fact that religion 
could be seen as a source of validity for political views, whereby theology has 
been treated as an offshoot of politics, though still significant in relation to 
tribal and political rivalries.45 Meanwhile, Kennedy introduces an interesting, 
but very brief, claim that a lack of religious authority on the part of the 
Umayyads led to their downfall. Unfortunately he does not attempt to support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





this claim.46 The following is a brief description and overview of other religious 
beliefs and some of their infamous followers, in order to gauge the developing 
religious opposition that the Umayyads faced.    
 There are several religious sects that were developing during the 
Umayyad Empire, which attempted to usurp the political and religious 
legitimacy of the Umayyads through the development of religious doctrines 
that attempted to discredit their religious authority or advocated other 
theological and political programs within the Umayyad administration. Among 
the several burgeoning religious doctrines and sects, the Qadariyya and 
Murji’a will be outlined briefly as these religious movements appear in the 
case studies, found in chapter four.  
The Qadariyya are predecessors to the Mu‘tazila, who later gained 
power under the Abbasids during the reign of al-Ma’mun (r.197-218/813-833). 
The Qadariyya believed in human beings’ free will, as opposed to 
predestination, along with the createdness of the Qur’an and using reason to 
understand God. Since the Qadariyya were advocates of free will, it follows 
that the actions of the caliph are the result of free will and thereby 
accountable to the people and to God.  The concept of accountability to God 
stands in stark contrast to previous theologies concerning the caliph, in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




the caliph represents God’s predestined choice for absolute authority and 
therefore cannot be guilty of injustice or opposing God’s will.47  
The importance of the Qadariyya during the third fitna becomes clear 
when Yazid III adopted it as an ideology in his rebellion against al-Walid II. 
Using the religious legitimacy of the Qadariyya, as well as the military support 
for the Yamanī, his coup against al-Walid II was completed. His explanation 
for rebellion against the absolute authority of al-Walid II “ordained by God” 
was that al-Walid was not abiding by the Book of God or the sunna of the 
Prophet and also that he was guilty of “innovation” or bid‘a. Yazid III explained 
that one should only be obedient to God and that disobedience “to a human 
ruler cannot entail disobedience to God.”48 Therefore, Yazid’s explanation for 
his coup rested on the reasoning of the Qadariyya; meanwhile in order to 
justify his own theology, he accused al-Walid of innovation or heresy.49  After 
taking the caliphate, however, his theology slowly reverted to al-Walid’s 
theological justification for absolute rule of the caliph, God’s divine will.50 
Therefore the relationship of Yazid to Qadarī theology should be regarded as 
simply an oppositional strategy, rather than true adherence. 
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The Murji’a are another large and diverse theological group developing 
and solidifying around the time of the third fitna. Their main unifying belief is 
the theological doctrine of suspending judgment for God, which refers back to 
the first fitna, when the community split.51 By suspending judgment for God, 
Muslims could rest assured that Islam and people who had fallen on either 
side of the first fitna had not strayed from God’s path. For that reason Murji’a 
were known as quietists, those who believed in the umma or unity of Islamic 
community. The Murji’a were also known advocates for the non-Arab converts 
to Islam.52 A later term associated with the root for the Arabic word Murji’a is 
irjā, meaning to defer judgment to God and therefore to abide by the 
consensus of the Islamic community, in order to keep on the religious path.53 
Another quality of the Murji’a, found within the Sīrat Sālim (ca. 75/695), is an 
“attitude toward the ‘kings of their people,’ i.e. the contemporary rulers.”54 
Basically the Murji’a did not approve of Mu‘awiya’s rule. Cook reveals further 
that the author of the sīrah points to a sub-group of the Murji’a that believes 
the caliphs are unbelievers, as opposed to the general Murji’a belief that the 
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“Murdji’a”; Michael Cook, Early Muslim Dogma (Cambridge, England: 
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rulers are sinful believers.55 Though Madelung believes that while they were 
concerned with the unity of the community, they also believed they could 
revolt, which describes the sub-group within the Murji’a and al-Harith himself, 
though this is greatly debated.56  
While the Murji’a subscribe to different values than the Qadariyya, 
these two groups may overlap in beliefs. One heretic, Ghaylan al-Dimashqi, is 
accused of being both a Qadarite and Murji’ite. Meanwhile, al-Harith and his 
secretary, Jahm57, to be discussed more in depth in chapter four, are labeled 
as Murji’ites.58 
The difficulty and complexity of the religious and theological factions at 
this time are indicative of the fractured nature of the Islamic world and while 
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57 While there are overlaps in the case of Gaylan between the label of Murj’ite 
and Qadarite, Jahm cannot be labeled a Qadarite in any regard, since his 
religious doctrines are those of predestination and not free will. However, 
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not as elucidative in the explanation of the third fitna as the tribal and political 
rivalries, religious difference still represents a significant aspect of the 
historical context. The overview of the Qadariyya and Murji’a demonstrates 
the complicated and tangled religious theological doctrines that were utilized 
politically in their struggle against the religious orthodoxy.   
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Chapter 2: Orthodoxy, Heresy & Heterodoxy 
 
What is Heresy? What is Orthodoxy? 
“Heresy” is a term derived from the Greek hairesis, which meant 
“choice.” 1 Originally devoid of negative connotation, the Christian Church 
adopted the Greek word and used it to condemn groups that embraced 
doctrinal differences, thereby imbuing it with negative implications.2 So, quite 
simply, the definition of heresy is beliefs or practices that challenge or subvert 
the orthodoxy, or mainstream beliefs and practices.3 The term “heresy” 
requires three factors: the assumption that there is an established orthodoxy 
or a set of correct religious beliefs and/or practices, which is accepted widely 
among the populace. It also requires a structure or institution within the 
orthodoxy that will condemn a particular group or faction for practicing the 
religion with certain deviations, which the orthodoxy determines run counter to 
it and/or its authority and dogmas or doctrines that elucidate the line between 
the orthodoxy and those which the orthodoxy rejects. Finally, it requires those 
who believe or practice differently enough to be considered apostates.    
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In fact, heresy, as demonstrated by the Christian Church’s 
understanding, is a phenomenon restricted to monotheistic religions, as 
Fowden argues in his book Empire to Commonwealth. He explains that for 
better or worse monotheism gained the political legitimation previously 
afforded to the secular authority.4  Assman adds to Fowden’s conception of 
monotheism when he asserts that polytheism is tolerant and monotheism 
intolerant.5 Fowden continues that although monotheism has the advantage 
of strengthening its political authority, it also faces numerous and 
overwhelming differences between the central authority and those areas only 
loosely under its control, which is the case within Khurasan where the case 
study takes place. Whereas in polytheism the numerous theological practices 
and beliefs could be interwoven with each other to support the “emperor cult,” 
monotheisms express a more rigid belief system that requires general 
conformity and are actually “sustained by their negative energy, their power of 
negation and exclusion.”6  With the geographical and cultural differences, 
there were obvious differences between the central authority and the 
periphery, who were portrayed as “heretical groups,” but who considered 
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5 Assman, The Price of Monotheism, 14. 
6 Ibid.; Fowden, Empire to Commonwealth Consequences of Monotheism in 
Late Antiquity, 108. 
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themselves as the orthodox.7 Theological and practical differences between 
varieties of religious beliefs under polytheism were not socially or politically 
significant, but under monotheism these differences became enforceable by a 
central religious and political authority that had a monopoly on the Truth.8 
The issue of heresy within monotheistic religions is quite vast, 
considering the different religions and how differences in doctrine and 
practice are treated. The specific question of heresy in Islam is also a difficult 
one, due to numerous factors. The first of these is that the terminology 
associated with “heresy” is historically Christian and therefore definitions are 
imbued with Christian history. It will be beneficial then to first explore these 
terms within the framework of the Christian Church, and explicate the 
significant differences between these two religions. Historically, heresy within 
the Christian Church was/is a transgression against a Christian’s covenant 
with God and thus apostasy.9 The Christian Church was best equipped to 
define an apostate and heretical derivations of Christianity due to its process 
of establishing dogmas, such as the Nicene Creed in 325 CE.10  However, 
even with this dogma in place it took some time before the Papal authority 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Fowden, Empire to Commonwealth Consequences of Monotheism in Late 
Antiquity, 108. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Van Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology, 11. 
10 Ibid., 12; Freeman, A.D. 381 Heretics, Pagans, and the Dawn of the 
Monotheistic State, xix. 
	   31 
chose and/or was able to enforce a single Christian sect as the orthodox. 
Freeman argues that it was not until 381 CE that the Christian Roman 
emperor Theodosius was responsible for an edict that allowed the 
condemnation of “heretical” Christian beliefs.11   The hierarchy of the Church 
facilitated the development and implementation of these dogmas and 
therefore its “orthodoxy” since it created and disseminated legitimized 
symbols to the masses, in the form of oral recitation.12  But more importantly, 
the Christian Church also possessed the ability to excommunicate or deny 
someone a place within the Church, with the underlying penalty of forfeiting 
spiritual redemption in the afterlife.13 In 612/1215, the Church expanded its 
power in this respect to take secular action against a heretic, by coercing the 
secular state to pursue heretics criminally.14 
The Islamic system differs considerably from this model and therefore 
the term “heresy” must be explored in depth within the Islamic paradigm. 
First, the Muslim faith lacks the centralized infrastructure of the Christian 
Church; there is no body or hierarchy of individuals who are tasked with 
assisting Muslims in their practicing their religion or obtaining salvation. 
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Muslims are considered laypersons.15 Therefore the sacramentally positioned 
covenant that Muslims have with God is direct, not via clergy. Theologians did 
create oral dogmas for recitation, but there was no compulsion in them and 
they were only applicable for certain times or particular places.16 The 
introduction of the madrasa, which appeared under the Seljuks in the 11th 
century, is the only Islamic institution that some scholars consider slightly 
similar to the church-like structure, which would allow for establishing the 
orthodox sect and the heretical, but its late arrival and absent political power 
make it ineffective in this regard.17 Second, the Islamic religion lacks the 
concept of original sin that is found in Christianity. Muslims, as adherents to 
the Islamic faith, do not need to be redeemed, but rather refrain from sin by 
simply following the model of Muhammad and the laws put forth in the Qur’an. 
This clearly does not require the hierarchy that developed in the church to 
obtain forgiveness.  
The last and most important difference between the Christian and the 
Islamic model, closely related to the first point, is the fluidity of religious 
legitimation as opposed to the rigid authority structure of the Christian 
Church. This is evidenced by the Buyid dynasty (934-1055/322-447), which, 
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despite its Shi’a tendencies preserved the Sunni Arab caliphate and also the 
utilization of consensus within jurisprudence and dogmatism.18 The religious 
legitimation in the first instance can be argued to legitimize both sects of 
Islam, without condemnation of either as heretical. Consensus, which slowly 
developed over the first Islamic two centuries as a technique to reconcile 
multiple jurists’ opinions,19 provided boundless occasions for one particular 
group to agree that something is permissible and for another to condemn it as 
heresy.20 However, Hallaq argues that ijmā‘, or consensus, began as a part of 
the sunna, because legal experts upheld the sunna in agreement. Yet, Hallaq 
does not mention who these legal experts are, how they became legal 
experts and whether this precludes or includes members of burgeoning or 
proto-sectarian groups. Slowly, ijmā‘  became more developed in its 
application towards hadith.21  Two traditions demonstrate the position of ijmā‘ 
on the topic of heresy and sectarianism within the society. One tradition 
states that there are/will be 72 or 73 sects of Islam and only one will be 
saved.22 The other tradition states that the “community will never agree on 
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error.”23 These traditions were likely established to explain the divisions in the 
early Islamic community and to emphasize the importance and position ijmā‘ 
plays in Islamic law and society.  Van Ess cautions, ijmā‘ operated after the 
fact, once society had already assessed the issue and/or group.24 It was only 
after this that the legal jurists employed ijmā‘  to confirm the decision. For this 
reason various Islamic authorities were able to tout Islamic orthodoxy, but 
there was no early or widespread organization dedicated to the protection of 
orthodoxy and the detection of heresy, as there was in the Christian Church.  
By viewing heresy and how it interacts differently within the Christian 
Church and within the Islamic religion, it is possible to comprehend that this 
complex issue may rest on two spheres within religion itself: dogma and 
practice.25 Within Christianity, heresy refers mainly to belief in different 
dogmas, i.e., Jesus has one nature, divine and human in Monophysitism but 
in Nestorianism he has two loosely united natures. However, in Islam, with no 
clergy or Church-like organizational structure, the concern over dogmas in the 
Christian Church turned into the daily concern about religious practice for 
Muslims.  Therefore in Islam there is also a great emphasis on jurisprudence 
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and practices.26  The assertion made by Van Ess that Islamic dogmatism 
grew out of Islamic jurisprudence may suggest that the two are linked/related 
and equally important in regards to heresy in Islam. 27  
 
Islamic Framework for “Heresy/Heterodoxy” 
After reviewing heresy in the Christian Church, it seems that it does not 
fit seamlessly into the Islamic framework. It can be argued that the Islamic 
context has levels of belief, ranging from believer to heretic, with an 
intermediary stage that lends the early Islamic model more to heterodoxy than 
heresy.  The difference between heterodoxy and heresy is the general 
acceptance of different sectarian groups in the former, with different beliefs 
and practices, as Muslims in name and in spirit, while the model for heresy 
flatly rejects the claim that groups with different beliefs and practices can be 
accepted as Muslims.28 The terminology applied to “heretical” groups in Islam 
is all clearly negative, but the majority of heresiographers still indicate that the 
accuser still considers them Muslims, “a contributor within Islamic history.”29 
As evidence towards this fact, the early Islamic heresiographer, al-Baghdādī 
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(d. 428/1037), ranks Muslim sects over non-Muslim traditions in the damage 
they have caused Islam.30 The terminology associated with heresy and 
heterodoxy will be explored in depth below.  
The term used in the Qur’an for the followers of Muhammad is 
mū’minīn, believers, while one who is not is considered a kāfir, an apostate or 
unbeliever.31 Jews and Christians are considered ahl al-kitāb or People of the 
Book, who embody a position somewhere between a heretic and a muslim (a 
believer). Related to a separate issue, Fred Donner argues that Islam began 
as an ecumenical movement of Jews, Christians and Muslims, but slowly 
crystallized into a distinctly Islamic identity around the time of ‘Abd al-Malik (r. 
685-705), an issue that this thesis will return to in this chapter.32  
Arabic terms like bid‘a, ghulʾat, nafaqa, takfīr, ilḥād and zandaqa, found 
in the Qur’an or other early Islamic texts, appear in various contexts related to 
heresy.33 Of those terms, four of the words’ roots have been found in the 
Qur’an: l-ḥ-d, b-d-ʿ and  n-f-q. 34  The first root refers to blasphemy, either 
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disbelief or the use of God’s name incorrectly. Bid‘a refers to innovation in the 
religion caused by deviation, which the Twelver Shi’a were usually accused 
of.35 N-f-q means hypocrisy. Ghulʾat or exaggerators are those who are 
excessively in disagreement in any particular doctrine or practice; this is seen 
as a type of heretical action, though it does not apply to all Shiʿa or Khawārij, 
who are still considered Muslims. Instead it only refers to those among those 
groups whose views are so extreme that their beliefs run counter to 
monotheism or other major doctrines in Islam.36 Zandaqa is not found in the 
Qur’an, and is likely Persian;37 it means “free thought” or “heresy,” but was 
used extensively in reference to the Manicheans or those professing Islam 
with some dualist beliefs as well.38 Later, it became an administrative term 
referring to a person posing a political or societal threat as well as holding 
unorthodox beliefs.39  Mulḥid, from the Qur’anic root, l-ḥ-d refers to the 
“deviator,” the original non-believer, the rationalist, materialist or atheist.  
Though it was used by classical theologians, it eventually replaced the term 
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zandaqa during the Ottoman Empire.40  Some terms related to heresy and 
orthodoxy were imported straight from Christian writings, such as the term 
heresy itself transformed into hawā in the Arabic, known also in the plural as 
āhwāʾ.41Another term is hartaqa or heresy from the Syriac.42 These are terms 
used in association with disbelief or wrong belief in reference to Islamic 
thought and practice. 
The term kufr or kāfir are the two closest terms for heresy and heretic 
that can be found in Arabic. According to Lewis, this term “is adequate to 
express the full force of the Christian concept of heresy.”43 While the other 
terms may be somewhat inclusive of different sects, this term refers to 
nonbelievers, not Muslims who have sinned and can be redeemed. However, 
Lewis’ claim neglects the importance of the Christian context that is 
incorporated into the term; and this context is clearly missing from early 
Islamic history.  Their status as nonbelievers also impacts their legal status in 
the community, i.e.,  nonbelievers’ ability to marry, testify, etc.44 The term 
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takfīr indicates that the common practice of calling out heretics, since it 
means, “charge of unbelief; or seduction to infidelity.”45 The first group to 
utilize accusations of heresy was the Khawārij, thereby claiming to be the only 
true Muslims, while others were actually living in a state of apostasy and 
unbelief. Van Ess believes that this charge of disbelief on others was primarily 
political and used to distance themselves from non-Khawārij.46 Lewis asserts 
while religious debate over theological doctrines and practices were taken 
very seriously and kept at a theological level, the charges of takfīr were 
largely polemical and did not affect the legal status of those accused.47  
Therefore due to the difficulty in drawing permanent and distinct criteria 
regarding the status of belief, the denunciation and condemnation of 
nonbelievers is largely useless in indicating theological orthodoxy.48  
Medieval Islamic scholars, ranging from al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) to Ibn 
Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) have struggled to determine the criteria of being a 
Muslim. At its minimum standards, a Muslim would testify to the unity of God 
and Muhammad as his prophet. Others require the physical rituals to be 
performed as minimal evidence towards his belief. Ibn Taymiyya takes a more 
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extreme standpoint and requires excessive proof of a person’s belief.49 
Regardless, the use of force against perceived heretics existed in early Islam 
despite the inability to fully define who is a believer and what exactly is the 
orthodoxy in Islam. This is well balanced by evidence of tolerance of religious 
differences across sects at all different levels of society. 
Taylor argues that this dichotomy of tolerance and orthodoxy produces 
a unique current that permits differences within the religion, but still carries 
social pressure for those outliers to conform and reform their religious beliefs 
to the “orthodox.”50 He rejects the concept that heresy or heterodoxy best 
describes the phenomenon in early Islam, but argues that a mixture of both 
produced an atmosphere that was compatible with multiple sects, but did not 
embody the rationalism and liberalism necessary for true heterodoxy or a truly 
inclusive Islamic umma.51  
 
Theories of Heresy & Heterodoxy in Historical Contexts and their Application 
There have been several theories dedicated to the understanding of 
heresy, heterodoxy, and orthodoxy in historical and anthropological fields of 
study. Hence, there is a major debate regarding how orthodoxy is 
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established, the purpose and place of heterodoxy and how and why 
heterodoxy and heresy arise in different historical contexts. Due to its broad 
nature and wide applicability across several fields of study, this chapter will 
concentrate on heresy and heterodoxy in the medieval contexts, both Islamic 
and Christian and also in the contemporary Islamic fields, in the case of the 
Baha’i.  
First, Lewis develops a flexible theory on orthodoxy and Islam as 
continually in flux, changing based on perspective and ruling party. He views 
the sectarianism in Islam as heresies with the two first and major heresies 
being the Shiʿa and the Khawārij, since orthodoxy was established under the 
Prophet.52  Lewis continues in this vein and claims that orthodoxy was 
reestablished for a second time under the Abbasids, when embraced the 
“religion of the theologians.”53 This cyclical and relative approach to 
understanding orthodoxy affords the field of Islamic history enormous 
flexibility when interpreting and analyzing religious norms and values, as 
evidenced by the Fatimid dynasty that embraced the Ismāʿīlī  derivation of 
Shiʿa Islam, which could be considered the orthodoxy, since it was the ruling 
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religion.54 With the appearance and domination of the Seljuks, madrasas 
were created to further educate the Seljuks in the practice and beliefs of 
Sunni Islam, and guard against the heresy of the Ismāʿīlīs, still prevalent in the 
region.55 While this theory encompasses the enormous amount of complexity 
in the Islamic system, it is too vague and lacks any structure that could be 
used to further analyze this issue of heresy or sectarianism within Islam.  
On the other hand, van Ess’ theory on Islamic orthodoxy insists that 
orthodoxy is established when a single faction or belief system “extends 
beyond one locality,” even if this position in society is a temporary one.56 
Therefore heresy occurs after the establishment of orthodoxy, but its 
presence in society is well documented prior to the establishment of the 
orthodoxy. Therefore it is his assertion that orthodoxy was originally 
established when Mu‘tazila theology spread from Basra to Baghdad and 
assumedly throughout the empire.  While it expanded geographically it did not 
weaken or lose any part of its philosophy. Instead Mu‘tazila theology as a 
philosophy and orthodoxy was able to equalize between several local 
understandings.57 Van Ess’ theory, while initially compelling, becomes more 
complicated when extended into later historical contexts, when there are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ibid., 48‒49. 
55 Ibid., 49. 
56 Van Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology, 6‒8, 15. 
57 Ibid., 6. 
	   43 
multiple locations for different sects, such as the Ibāḍīs in the Mzab and 
present day Oman.  
Amir-Moezzi echoes this portion of van Ess’ theory, by also asserting 
that heresy relies on orthodoxy, which he dates to the reign of Abbasid caliph 
al-Ma’mun (r. 197-218/813-833).58  The simplicity of this premise, as was an 
issue with van Ess’ theory above, lacks the complexity to handle multiple 
Islamic empires at one time. Luckily, van Ess has continued to develop his 
theory on the conception of heresy in early Islam, providing a more universal 
and acceptable criterion for heretical belief and action.  
In van Ess’ 2011 interview with the Goethe Institut’s Fikrun wa Fann, 
he further clarifies and expands his theory on heresy, portraying an Islamic 
system that is more similar to heterodoxy than heresy. He asserts that Islam 
was accepting of differences in practice, with the exception of prayer, 
because Islam differed based on each garrison city.59  Van Ess believes the 
importance of the Qur’an may not have been as significant as once believed 
and it was only later that the practice of prayer and the Qur’an came to unite 
the cities together, which van Ess claims occurred during ‘Abd al-Malik’s reign 
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and the construction of the Dome of the Rock in 72/692.60  Despite the unity 
that van Ess claims at this time, he does not mention whether he still 
considers the establishment of an orthodoxy to remain during the time of the 
Mu‘tazila or whether he moves it back to the Marwanid period. Furthermore, 
van Ess limits the description of heretics within the Islamic model to those that 
question “Muhammad’s prophethood or person,” not those who question the 
constitutionality of Islamic law and the Qur’an from which it originates.61 
Therefore, it is not the Shi’a or the Khawārij that are considered heretics, but 
the ‘Alawites and other such groups.62 The ‘Alawites have in the twentieth 
century gained some religious legitimacy and some acceptance within the 
Islamic community since their rise in the Syrian military or the ceasing of 
rebellious activities.63 Van Ess’ elaborate theory on the diverse origins and 
traditions of Islam prior to the establishment of an orthodoxy lends credence 
to the heterodoxical nature of Islam, as opposed to the Christian model as 
well as provides the most important criteria for heretical groups in Islam: the 
questioning of Muhammad’s prophethood and position within Islam.  
Wansbrough’s theory on heresy stems from his background in biblical 
studies and overlaps with Van Ess’ theory regarding the development of 
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different beliefs and practice prior to a confirmed orthodoxy. He theorizes that 
heresies do not develop after an orthodox version of theology is established, 
but concurrently.64 These different and emerging Islamic theologies grew 
alongside one another, struggling for legitimation from the community. 
Therefore, heretic groups such as the Khawārij or Shiʿa were not officially 
considered as heretics until an orthodox vision of Islam was established and 
their vision officially lost its claim of legitimation for the entire Islamic 
community.65 It is unclear when Wansbrough asserts that Sunni Islam 
became the established orthodoxy and when the Khawārij fully lost 
legitimation within the community. 
MacEoin’s analysis of the branching of orthodox Shi’i Islam into the 
heterodox factions of Shaykhism and Babism and finally into the heresy or 
orthodoxy of the Bahai, demonstrates his theory about the concepts 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Borrowing from Max Weber, MacEoin views the 
eruption of heresies or different sects a result of “the breakthrough of fresh 
charisma.”66 Therefore the cycle begins with a religion being formed that 
addresses the spiritual needs of the people, but over time it becomes more of 
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this world. Therefore there becomes the need for redefinition of society or a 
new interpretation of religious expression. In accordance with Taylor, he 
suggests that the Islamic model contains a mix of heresy and heterodoxy, in 
that a certain amount of distance from the orthodoxy is permitted and 
acceptable at times.67 Different heterodoxies become unacceptable when the 
orthodox “feels the need to define itself, to set limits of the sacred universe,” 
and will persecute heretics.68  At the same time, this period when the 
orthodoxy feels the need to define itself represents a moment of vulnerability 
when sectarian groups may choose to “challenge authority.”69 Therefore, 
instability and uncertainty within or of the orthodoxy represents a dangerous 
time for sectarian movements. It is important to note that this vulnerability 
may also be political, but more importantly the instability concerns theological 
identity and expression of society. In accordance with Wansbrough’s theory 
about concurrent development, MacEoin states that the orthodoxy can then 
use these “heterodoxical” sects to define itself, making it an “other” and 
continuing to develop.70  
Therefore, MacEoin traces the origins of the Baha’i faith as a sect of 
Islam, demonstrating the evolutionary process from orthodoxy to heterodoxy 
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and finally to complete heresy/discrete and separate orthodoxy.  MacEoin’s 
theory of orthodoxy, heterodoxy, and heresy while rooted and applied to the 
nineteenth century, fits nicely with van Ess’ most recent theory on Islamic 
heresy and seems relevant for application in a medieval context, despite the 
fact it has not yet been used in a pre-modern context. In addition, the 
tolerance of heterodoxy combined with the persecution of heresies speaks to 
Taylor’s assertion of a combination between these concepts. MacEoin’s 
theory is a practical and applicable model for the analysis of orthodoxies and 
heterodoxies because it speaks to the reasoning and explanation for both 
stances by Islamic authorities at different times. In short, MacEoin’s theory 
attributes religious divergences to their political and social contexts, which is a 
useful interpretation for the theological issues during the 3rd fitna (ca. 743-
750).  
Finally, Talal Asad reviews medieval heresy from an anthropological 
perspective and writes in response to Janet Nelson’s article on the origins of 
heresy in the medieval Christian context. Nelson’s theory is somewhat similar 
to MacEoin’s model. However unlike MacEoin’s analysis, she describes a 
“stable society served by a coherent ideology (religious beliefs and rituals)” as 
a starting point.71  With economic and political developments this belief 
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system suffers due to its lack of flexibility and adaptability to the new 
circumstances, not in a social-psychological way, but due to theodicy: “when 
a religion fails logically to explain human suffering or fortune in terms of its 
system of beliefs.”72 The theodicy is caused by disorientation, best illustrated 
by the increase in mobility, both vertically in the social hierarchy and 
geographically.73 Thus, she is attempting to explain why some people are 
drawn to developing heretical movements. The marginalized people of society 
suffer a crisis of faith, due to their poor fortunes. Their crisis of faith results in 
renewed fervor of religious traditions, but eventually concludes in the “rigidity” 
of religious institutions, or stricter and reinforced traditions and dogmas, which 
assert religious orthodoxy.74 This “rigidity” within the religious sphere 
produces two types of heretical movements, those looking for communion 
with the divine through ascetism and evangelism and those that desire to 
purify the sect from the corruption of the orthodoxy.75  These two options in 
heretical movements demonstrate that Nelson views heresy as a problem of 
logic, and both heretical solutions resolve the theodicy by “eliminating the 
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contradiction between beliefs.”76  She proceeds to argue that the presence of 
a strong political leader hinders heretical outbreaks, because a strong political 
leader is able to steadily control the social and economic changes over time, 
so as to lessen the impact on the population.77  
Nelson’s model is quite detailed and clearly based on a Christian 
model. However it has a lot in common with MacEoin’s theory, in that it is 
attempting to understand and explain the creation of heresies in general. 
Nelson contributes to MacEoin’s theory by providing socio-psychological 
factors that contribute to the development of religious heresies, roughly a 
thousand years after the establishment of an Islamic orthodoxy. Within the 
Islamic framework the debate over heresies and heterodoxies is positioned a 
lot closer to the origin of Islam in time. However, this does not mean her 
theory does not apply. First, the theological “pressure” that the Church 
employs, which she refers to as an effect of change and theodicy and the 
cause of heretical movements, can be likened to MacEoin’s redefinition of the 
orthodoxy, which presents itself as a hardline approach against dissenters, 
but also as an opportunity for them to challenge authority. Second, Nelson’s 
possible socio-psychological cause for people to search for religious 
divergence should not be disregarded completely yet either. Therefore her 
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approach to medieval Christian heresy presents the intriguing questions that 
should be adapted and analyzed in the medieval Islamic context; specifically 
does change and theodicy lie at the roots of heretical movements? 
Talal Asad reviews Nelson’s approach to medieval Christian heresy 
and presents more intriguing questions of his own regarding how to study 
Christian heresy or heresy in general. He presents two other alternatives to a 
logical resolution of theodicy: the moral resolution (reorganizing suffering or 
seeking to eliminate it) or “a periodic social-psychological” resolution 
(replacing old outdated world views with ones that are better suited toward 
contemporaneous experiences).78  Asad flatly rejects the periodic social-
psychological issue without explanation, but continues approaching heresy as 
a moral dilemma and not a logical one.  Perhaps he would reconsider this 
rejection if he were concerned with the early Islamic context. He comes to 
similar conclusions as Nelson, but from a different direction. First, he agrees 
that the strong political authority does stave off religious heresy in the 
Christian context, not because its control the social conditions that lead to 
change, but because its defense of the Church was one way of defending its 
political power.79 As evidence for this point, the smaller regions were prone to 
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bouts of heresies, due to the lack of a strong Church presence.80 This leads 
Asad to suggest an approach on heresy that is contingent on Church 
condemnation and centers of power as opposed to the analysis of “heretical 
psychology.”81  
Asad’s reasoning for this approach is due the fact that heretical groups 
are all different, arising from different social, political and economic 
conditions, and most importantly the only common factor between them is the 
label of “heresy,” which the Church ascribed to them because each 
represented a threat to the authority of the Church and the “Truth.”82 He is 
therefore suggesting an analysis of these groups in relation to the danger 
they pose to the Church’s authority, and specifically why the Church chooses 
to “seek out” this danger instead of “responding” to it.83  This is a thoughtful 
and productive approach; unfortunately, Asad admits that Islam lacks the 
centralized institutional techniques for condemning heresy, as has been 
previously discussed. This complicates any prospective adaptation of his 
approach to the Islamic model considerably. But more importantly Asad 
suggests that the origins and conditions in which heresy arise are not 
important in the broader view of heresy. This is a debatable point.  The 
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differences between the Christian model and the Islamic models are 
significant, but the methods and concepts should be able to be adapted to 
provide fruitful analysis on the issue of heresy and heterodoxy, institutional 
authorities, what leads the authority to confront rather than respond to 
dissenters, and finally the effect of theodicy, caused by a logical/emotional 
disorientation.  
The majority of theorists on the subject of heresy and heterodoxy 
concur that, within Islam, heresy and differing religious practices and beliefs 
do not appear on the heels of the founding of the orthodoxy, but develop 
concurrently. The orthodoxy is selected from one of these strands of Islam as 
the orthodoxy or orthodoxies develop in response to the religious, doctrinal 
and practical issues that are raised by “proto-heretical” groups. A definition of 
the orthodoxy and when it was founded must be explicitly analyzed and 
determined, in order to determine how and which “proto-heretical” groups 
influenced the forthcoming orthodoxy. 
 
Islamic Orthodoxy 
One of the first conclusions one can come to about Islamic orthodoxy 
is that it is established with the revelation of the Qur’an and the sunna of the 
Prophet Muhammad. However, accepting this claim does nothing to further 
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the study of which faction is the orthodox or heretical or why this has come to 
be; instead by asserting that Islam has not changed since the death of the 
Prophet, this claim rejects all analysis and investigation on this topic.  Rather 
by using only the Qur’an and the sunna, the investigation is limited to heresy 
in reference to the prophet Muhammad’s original message, which was usually 
in relation to the Abrahamic religions that had “distorted God’s true message.”  
Many scholars put the estimated arrival of an Islamic orthodoxy under the rule 
of al-Ma’mun (r. 197-208/813-833), due to his participation in the miḥna or 
trials against Ahmad ibn Hanbal and the doctrines against the uncreatedness 
of the Qur’an.84 This Mu‘tazila orthodoxy clearly does not mean that all the 
people of the empire, from Spain to China practiced or understood Islam in 
this particular manner. Rather it simply means that religious and political 
leaders constructed an intellectual orthodoxy the represented the position and 
power of the empire. 
However, Orientalist literature places the establishment of heresies at 
the development of the two major heretical sects in early Islam: the Shiʿa and 
the Khawārij.85  In his recent book, Najam Haider places the establishment of 
a united Shi’a sect in the 2nd/8th century, prior to Van Ess’ estimation of an 
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established orthodoxy. This united Shi’a faction fulfills Van Ess’ criteria of 
extending beyond one locality, from Kufa to Khurasan (Iran) as a part of the 
Abbasid Revolution or da‘wa.86 Therefore, even if an established 
“mainstream” cannot be proven, an established religious movement with an 
allegiance to the descendants of ʿAli that stands clearly in the minority and 
separate from “others” may be sufficient to demonstrate orthodox and 
heretical movements or heterodoxy. Haider approaches the narratives of the 
Shi’a community by tracking the transmitters of hadith and heresiography to 
determine the date they were first transmitted and therefore the reliability of 
their content. He utilizes this method to determine that distinct religious 
practices, such as the gathering at shrines and some different theological 
views, emerged to form a distinct Imāmī Shi’a community and identity by the 
2nd/8th century.87 
Haider’s book also is compatible with Van Ess’ assertion that 
jurisprudence impacted/affected theological doctrine and not the other way 
around. Haider bases his claim on Sunni acceptance of innovative legal 
figures, such as al-A‘mash (d. 148/765), who followed normative religious 
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ritual, but was responsible for infusing intercession and ʿAli’s superior position 
vis-a-vis the Prophet’s companions within Shi’i theological doctrine.88 
If one is convinced by the thesis of Donner’s most recent book 
Muhammad and the Believers, then a strong claim can be made that Islamic 
orthodoxy developed under the Marwanids, during the reign of ‘Abd al-Malik. 
While his book makes no such claim, his time line of events places the origin 
of Islam, a new discrete and distinct religion, at a time when the 
administration of the empire had reached a level to develop and disseminate 
the symbols of legitimation of Islam. Prior to this, Islam was an ecumenical 
movement, comprised of Muslims, Jews and Christians, and the Dome of the 
Rock and the second part of the shahada are indications that Islam evolved 
as a distinct religion, independent from the other Abrahamic religions. But are 
distinction from other religions and the capability to propagate Islam 
throughout the empire enough to indicate orthodoxy? Donner’s placement of 
a distinct Islam during ‘Abd al-Malik’s reign postdates the first and second 
fitnas (35-41/656-661 and 63-73/683-692 respectively), which indicates that 
the ‘Alids, Khawārij, and the Zubayrids must be considered heretics 
developing at the same time as the orthodoxy and challenging the developing 
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orthodoxy for legitimacy, lending credence to Wansbrough’s theory on heresy 
discussed above.   
In her book God’s Caliph, Patricia Crone’s argument for the religious 
authority of the Umayyads also supports the concept that Islamic orthodoxy 
was formed under the Umayyads, if not prior to them. Her analysis of the term 
khalīfat Allah (deputy of God), without the intermediary rasūl (prophet), 
indicates that the religious power from God was initially appropriated without 
the need to rest on the Prophet Muhammad.89 The religious legitimacy that 
Crone attributes to the Sufyanids and later to the Marwanids, is based on 
their titles, and caliphal law within the documentary evidence.90  
In God’s Rule, Crone elaborates on Islamic orthodoxy by analyzing 
political thought and development in medieval Islam. She concludes that the 
development of society, government/administration and Islam began as one 
in Muhammad’s Medina, but slowly sharī‘a became less significant in 
presiding over the government, while it remained an essential part of 
society.91 This slow evolution of political thought and separation of the 
religious from the political demonstrates a developing and evolving political 
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Islam, 24. 
90 Ibid., 24‒25,44. 
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orthodoxy.92 Crone asserts this slow development occurred after 
Muhammad’s death and this stage of evolution was finished around 232/847, 
when it was clear that the miḥna (218-232/833-847) had failed.93  The 
religious orthodoxy, therefore, was established after the miḥna, when the 
religious authority was in the hands of the religious scholars and certain 
theological limits were set.  While the Abbasids had come to power with the 
precedence of religious authority, their failed attempt to exert it during the 
miḥna resulted in the loss of religious authority, which then was dispersed 
among the religious scholars.94 Van Ess declares that the miḥna indicates the 
first Islamic orthodoxy, whereas Crone specifies the end of the miḥna 
indicates the separation of religious and political authority for the Abbasids. 
The next section of this chapter will discuss the distinction between religious 
and political orthodoxy and the development of both.  
 
Political Orthodoxy vs. Religious Orthodoxy 
After reviewing the literature on heresy or heterodoxy in Islam, it 
seems that there are two major foci concerning orthodoxy, both in time and 
variety. First, a large number of scholars seemed focused on the Umayyad 
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period, including Donner, Judd, and Crone as a period of orthodoxy, while the 
second group firmly roots their conception of Islamic orthodoxy with the 
miḥna.  While Donner makes an excellent argument concerning the 
solidification of an Islamic identity during ‘Abd al-Malik’s reign, he is 
essentially arguing for the establishment of an Islamic political orthodoxy and 
the definition of a discrete Muslim identity. The religious orthodoxy, a 
comprehensive and enforceable set of theological dogmas and practices, is 
established during or after the miḥna, as a developing strand of Islam, proto-
Sunnism, is selected and legitimized as the religion of the empire. 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of literature on heresy in general and within several 
specific fields has produced a broad perspective on the concept of heresy 
and heterodoxy within the field of Islam. The hierarchy of approval, 
begrudging acceptance, and flat out rejection of particular religious groups 
demonstrates a heterodoxical religious system in early Islam. This is due to 
the presence of multiple types of Islam prior to the establishment of the 
orthodoxy as purported by Wansbrough, or the denial of a single orthodoxy 
even ever existing, as suggested by van Ess. The absence of a 
religious/political institutions that police and enforce religious orthodoxy also 
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lend credence to this thesis, suggested by Lewis and van Ess. However, the 
dismissal of very specific groups seems to support van Ess’ theory that 
rejection or questioning of Muhammad’s place in Islam as the seal of the 
prophets is the sole criterion for those groups guilty of apostasy.95 Despite 
this strict criterion and the limited information regarding its circumstances, van 
Ess identifies numerous people considered heretics, including Jahm ibn 
Safwan who will be discussed in chapter four.96 He admits himself that the 
trials of these particular heretics seem political in nature and that essential 
information is missing; yet there is an important distinction between these 
larger heterodoxical groups that have slowly been accepted through time, and 
those that were rejected and “put down,” such as Ghaylan al-Dimashqi (d. 
105/723) and Ja‘d ibn Dirham (d. 118/736). This thesis will concentrate on the 
late Umayyad period and determine whether those smaller heretical groups 
represent heretics or heterodoxical groups, the difference between them and 
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Chapter 3: Primary Sources  
 
  The analysis of heretical or heterodoxical movements in early Islamic 
history begins with the selection of the primary source material.  However, 
documentary sources contemporary with the events in question are rare for 
the first two centuries of Islam.1 Instead scholars focusing on early Islamic 
history must rely on chronicles written at a later date, which claim to preserve 
earlier written work and historical knowledge. In order to demonstrate the 
veracity of these claims, modern scholars supplement the information from 
these chronicles with alternative sources. Scholars utilize non-traditional 
sources, such as non-documentary sources, coins and archeology, as well as 
contemporary documentary sources from non-Muslim writers and 
communities.  These alternative methods are an important supplement to the 
Muslim chronicles, which detail the events of the Muslim community from the 
creation of the World to the Abbasid Empire.  Muslim scholars in the Abbasid 
Empire wrote and compiled oral and written records of events nearly two 
centuries after the rise of Islam. This raises a large debate concerning the 
accuracy and quality of the information transmitted during that time. This 
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portion of the paper will quickly outline this debate and then focus on 
contextualizing the primary sources utilized in this study.  
 
Problem of the Sources 
 Despite the famous quote by Ernest Renan that Islam was born in the 
full light of history, early Islamic history largely lacks documentary sources 
contemporary with historical events.  This current dearth of contemporary 
documentary evidence from Islamic society for historical events does not 
mean that early Islamic society did not accurately record historical events.  
The method of recording historical events within Islamic society relied on the 
mixture of oral transmission with assistance from written materials, 
memorizing knowledge and passing it down from generation to generation.2 
The reasoning behind the prevalence of oral transmission of knowledge lies in 
the climate, which hindered the preservation of paper, the lack of writing 
materials, and illiteracy.3  
 The critique of oral transmission is that the information can get 
distorted and changed over time, so much so that this invalidates the use of 
oral transmission and the information gathered from it due to inaccuracy. 
John Wansbrough is a prime example of a modern scholar who has taken this 
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position to the extreme; his scholarship questions the very basic framework of 
the traditional Muslim narrative, by doubting the rise of Islam took place in the 
Hijaz.4 The skepticism on the reliability of all major Islamic narrative sources 
on this early period results in a serious dilemma: how can a modern scholar 
trust the extant information collected and written in chronicles about events 
that took place two centuries earlier? The answer is, one must proceed with 
caution. Efforts have been made to contest this overwhelming skepticism with 
relevant scholarship combating the major critique that oral transmission is 
ultimately unreliable. This scholarship credits the reliability of the human 
memory,5 and the usage of some textual transmission alongside the oral.6  
This scholarship restores some confidence in the reliability of the 
sources, but a healthy dose of skepticism remains.  The modern scholar is 
then left with large quantities of information from Islamic scholars who 
comment on the early centuries of Islam, for which there is little direct 
evidence available to the modern scholar. This in turn must be vetted through 
what Fred Donner terms, “the Tradition-Critical Approach.”7  This approach 
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asserts that a “kernel of historical fact” can be deciphered through the 
analysis of the chain of transmitters, as well as the summary of events. 
Therefore, the numerous historical chronicles and other writings that were 
produced in the Abbasid era contain valuable and reliable knowledge on the 
first two centuries of Islam.8   
There are several authors who compiled and edited earlier accounts of 
significant events in early Islam within their chronicles. Each of these sources 
faces similar charges of agenda, which may have impacted the authors’ 
reading and interpretation of events that they themselves did not live through. 
In the face of this criticism, al-Tabari’s chronicle represents the ideal resource 
that acts as a baseline for this particular study.  The specific reasoning for its 
use in this study follows. 
 
Al-Tabari: The Baseline/Framework Contextualized 
The study of Islamic history, particularly during the late Umayyad 
period largely relies on one of the most prolific writers in early Islam, Abu 
Ja’far Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari (d. 310/923).  He was a muḥaddith and 
an Islamic jurist who founded his somewhat ephemeral own school of law, but 
he is most renowned for his contribution to Islamic history, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




al-Mulūk, completed around 302/915, which is a lengthy and detailed 
universal history starting with the creation of the world.  
As stated above, al-Tabari was not the only Muslim scholar who wrote 
compilations of historical information, therefore it is important to explain why 
al-Tabari’s work will be at the center of this study and also what its position is 
in the field of Islamic history. The central reason al-Tabari’s chronicle is 
chosen is because it contains a detailed summary of events prior to and 
during the third fitna from a tribal/political perspective. He attributes the fall of 
the Umayyad Empire to tribal conflicts and political discord, whereas al-
Baladhuri (d. 279/892), another Islamic author, uses a religious framework to 
explain the failure of the Umayyad Empire.9  Although the paper makes 
selective use of al-Baladhuri’s narrative of the late Umayyad period,  the 
extensive details within al-Tabari’s chronicle, combined with a politically 
driven narrative framework, allows a more complete and subtle picture of the 
period to develop. Therefore, al-Tabari’s narrative, which runs counter to the 
examination of heresy and heretical movements made during that same time, 
provides an excellent source to interpret religious orthodoxy and heterodoxy. 
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Despite his religious training and the fact that history was for someone 
like him a religious science,10 al-Tabari is not particularly interested in matters 
related to Islam and religious norms; his comments on these subjects are 
scarce, and therefore they occur these comments become contextually 
important and especially significant to this study.  According to Shoshan, al-
Tabari was concerned with “making doctrinally correct statements,” as 
opposed to flowing narrative. In this regard, al-Tabari’s perspective on the 
third fitna seems very much involved with the successors to the Prophet and 
the sociopolitical order that he established. Al-Tabari places the blame on 
humanity without engaging in a discussion about divergences in religious 
practices or beliefs.11 Taking into account that al-Tabari’s focus in the 
chronicle is the unity of Islamic society, one could speculate that al-Tabari 
focuses on the tribal and political in order to keep from discussing the 
religious fracturing in the community and because he does not want to 
insinuate or associate divergences in the Islamic community with religious 
thought and practice. It is far more comfortable and healthy for the Islamic 
community for al-Tabari to speak about political and tribal conflicts causing 
discord within the community, rather than religious thought dividing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






community.12  However, due to the fact that religious material is found within 
his sources, intermixed with the political occurrences, al-Tabari must then 
confront his agenda of Islamic unity with the information available and is 
included in his chronicle. As a consequence, al-Tabari’s commentary on this 
subject is found within the language of the political and within political events.  
Al-Tabari’s political focus is in contrast to summaries or explanations of 
religious beliefs and practices that can be found in heresiographical sources, 
which also present heavy biases. The agenda that al-Tabari utilized, 
combined with his coverage of events, highlights the conception of heresy 
and religious divergence within a political turbulent period, making it an ideal 
outline for this study.13 
The formation of Islamic history and how modern scholars interpret it is 
largely defined by al-Tabari’s work Tārīkh al-Rasul wa al-Mulūk, since the 
work runs fifteen volumes starting from creation and ending at 302/915.14 The 
extant version of this text is actually a shortened version of his complete work 
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by the same title. 15 For this reason, his Tārīkh is easily and often taken as an 
authority on Islamic history,16 making it all the more important to question his 
influence and analyze his methodology and agenda and their implications on 
his writing, especially with regards to heretics during the later Umayyad times.   
His chronicle, among numerous other periods of Islamic history, details 
the slow and complicated breakdown of the Umayyad Empire, with particular 
emphasis on the political and tribal actors in the conflicts leading up to the 
Abbasid revolution in 132/750. Due to al-Tabari’s background, writing during 
the disintegration of the Abbasid Empire, he focuses more closely on the 
events in Iraq and Khurasan throughout his accounts, whereas events of 
North Africa and Egypt are largely missing or underrepresented in his 
works.17  While it stands to reason that heresy would thrive more on the 
fringes of the empires, as the Ibāḍīs exemplify in Mzab, Algeria and Oman, 
the issue of heresy and heterodoxy also presents itself in Iraq and Syria.18  
Al-Tabari’s chronicle, although an authoritative narrative of the early 
Islamic society, embodies the historiographical issues discussed earlier in this 
chapter. Since he wrote during the late 800s to early 900s CE about the 
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events of the early to mid-700s CE. This results in an almost 200-year gap 
between al-Tabari’s writing and the events themselves. The discrepancy in 
time periods presents multiple issues. The most obvious of these is that his 
perspective is imbued with historical biases. It is likely that al-Tabari may 
have unconsciously transferred or borrowed information, understandings, and 
concepts about political and religious institutions and events from his time, 
such as the fourth fitna and the miḥna, and applied them to the past.19 
Therefore there is a need to confront al-Tabari and his agenda with other 
sources on this study of heresy and heterodoxy. First, al-Tabari’s agenda and 
intentions will be described and analyzed and later in the chapter other 
narratives that will be used in the study to compare against al-Tabari’s 
narrative.  
A latent issue related to al-Tabari’s biases, particularly in the earliest 
part of the chronicle, is based on his source selection in two ways.  The first 
way the accounts are influenced by his historical circumstances is that al-
Tabari only has access to a finite number of stories and sources. There have 
been several studies concerning the analysis of al-Tabari’s sources, 
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Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography, 13. 
	   	   	  
	  
69 
authorities, and colleagues, a brief discussion of which follows below.20 
Conversely, accounts get lost, forgotten, and lose significance, all of which 
limits the number and variety of accounts that al-Tabari receives. This is 
natural in any environment and to the many other contemporary 
commentators during this period.  While this impacts the information that 
reaches scholars today, efforts have been made to resurrect accounts that 
have been thought to be lost and also to retrace the chains of transmission in 
order to gain greater insight into al-Tabari’s narrative process. Al-Tabari’s 
sources for his chronicle are known to be both written and oral, based on his 
contacts with colleagues and associates.21  
The discussion of al-Tabari’s sources within his Tārīkh demonstrates a 
wide range of sources for al-Tabari. His studies put him in contact with many 
scholars, including Ibn Humayd (d. 248/862).22 Ibn Humayd is one of al-
Tabari’s most frequently cited sources and al-Tabari also transmitted material 
from Ibn Ishaq (d. 144/761).23  Despite the fact that Ibn Ishaq lived during the 
period in question, the scholar’s major contribution was a biography of 
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Muhammad, which was later edited by Ibn Hisham (d. 220/835).24  Some of 
the historians whose reports were included into the Tārīkh were ‘Awana (d. 
147/764), Abu Mikhnaf (d. 157/774), Sayf ibn ‘Umar (d. 180/796), al-Mada’ini 
(d.215-236/830-850), and Waqidi (d. 208/823).25  Their akhbār, formerly in 
books and collections of their own concerning pre-Islamic Arabia up into the 
early Abbasid era, were transmitted through a chain of transmitters, which 
eventually reached al-Tabari, who selected and reorganized their reports for 
their inclusion into his Tārīkh. Al-Mada’ini wrote one such collection titled “The 
Shortened Book on the Khawārij,” which likely informs al-Tabari’s chronicle 
concerning the events and personages involved in the Khawārij rebellions.26 
To further inform al-Tabari’s agenda, it is important to note that some of these 
transmitters, such as Ibn Ishaq, received and relied on Abbasid patronage, 
which was meant to further establish and extend Abbasid authority.27  
The second way the chronicle is biased is that al-Tabari has selected 
which reports to include and exclude; this has a great effect on how one 
reads al-Tabari as a source, as well as other contemporary commentators. 
The structure of his chronicle demonstrates that while he includes several 
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reports on each event, the choice in which reports to include and in what 
order demonstrates the presence of al-Tabari’s subtle and possibly conscious 
agenda.   
Al-Tabari’s motivations and agenda within his historical work were to 
compile and incorporate several political and religious perspectives into one 
work that could be celebrated and respected by all as a unified Islamic 
history, particularly as he was writing in a time when the unity of the caliphate 
was collapsing.28 It is difficult to confirm his agenda absolutely since al-Tabari 
rarely comments or inserts his explicit voice/opinion into the text.29 Instead, al-
Tabari lets his sources speak for themselves, while al-Tabari implicitly speaks 
through his selection of reports and its organization.  He organized his text 
annalistically and included multiple reports on the same event from different 
perspectives, usually presenting “the impression of final authority” but also 
allowing him to “suggest two contradictory conclusions at once.”30 The fact 
that al-Tabari lacked a patron hints that he had the freedom to advance his 
own agenda within his writing and embrace viewpoints that were unpopular.31 
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However, Shoshan challenges this claim, arguing that al-Tabari’s historical 
work demonstrates an adherence to Abbasid principles and agendas, unlike 
his exegetical works.32 While this may be partially due to the reports 
themselves, al-Tabari’s specific selection of material demonstrates his 
inclusion and exclusion of information based on his agenda and bias.   
  With regard to al-Tabari’s selection of reports, one method of 
discerning his choices is to compare his work with other historians, such as 
al-Baladhuri, in relation to their common sources and the information they 
both were aware of, but diverged in utilizing. The content of the reports, their 
diversity, and inclusion indicate that al-Tabari had a preoccupation with 
reconciling the perspectives of different factions within the Islamic community, 
possibly to please his audience or to produce an acceptable unified Islamic 
history. He illustrates this with his defense of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib as the fourth 
Rightly Guided Caliph and the first Imam according to the Shi‘a. This example 
of compromise between Sunni and Shi‘a perspectives can be corroborated 
within his Qur’anic exegesis as well.33 And while he was accused of having 
Shi‘a sympathies for his defense of the Shi‘a minority, these claims are 
unsubstantiated.   With respect to al-Tabari’s choices of reports, he seems to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Shoshan, Poetics of Islamic Historiography Deconstructing Ṭabarī’s History, 
144. 
33 al-Ṭabarī and Rosenthal, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, 1:56. 
	   	   	  
	  
73 
neglect sources that look favorably towards the Umayyads and Zubayrids and 
uses sources that favor the Abbasids and ‘Alids.34 Al-Tabari’s distaste for the 
Umayyads and Zubayrids is paralleled by the Abbasid Empires efforts to 
“make terms” with the Shi‘a community, politically and religiously.35 Evidence 
of al-Tabari’s “compromise” between communities can be demonstrated by 
comparing al-Tabari to al-Baladhuri and noticing that al-Tabari had access to 
some reports about the allegiance and succession of Yazid I, but chose not to 
include them in his book so as to keep a favorable perspective on a Shi‘a 
imam and his legitimacy as opposed to Umayyad legitimacy. 36 
Perhaps the most convincing argument for al-Tabari finding the middle 
ground between the multiple communities is the possible motivation al-Tabari 
would have for drawing such conclusions.  During his lifetime God’s most 
perfect community was experiencing political and theological fragmentation, 
because of the miḥna or inquisition of al-Mu‘tasim (r. 218-228/833-842), 
where he persecuted the Mu‘tazila for their doctrine of the createdness of the 
Qur’an.37  At the same time, the Abbasid caliphate was also politically 
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declining given the caliphs’ lack of religious power and the eruption of the 
fourth fitna. The political tensions between the Abbasids and the Shi‘a, from 
whom the Abbasids had stolen the revolution, also represented a split in the 
community.38 His writing could be an effort to unify the community historically, 
by emphasizing the concept of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs, including the 
fourth caliph and first Shi’a Imam, ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, and by providing 
numerous perspectives so each sect could respect the chronicle as work 
depicting their views.  As the history becomes more recent to al-Tabari’s own 
time, he likely used the history of Umayyads, specifically their downfall, as a 
commentary on the political and theological fragmentation taking place under 
during the Abbasids.  
The Umayyads’ reputation as impious, secular rulers, within al-Tabari’s 
history and the Islamic sources in general, may also represent Abbasid 
propaganda, rather than just an objective explanation for the Abbasids’ rise to 
power. Their irreligious reputation likely stems from their ancestors’ late 
acceptance of Islam and possibly even due to ‘Uthman b. ‘Affan’s (r. 23-
35/644-656)39 poor political policies and assassination, which sparked the first 
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fitna.40 This poor reputation of the Umayyads continues in the portrayal of the 
Umayyad princes’ lifestyles as luxurious, with opulent architecture and art, as 
well as corruption and secular kingship.41 The un-Islamic behavior attributed 
to al-Walid ibn Yazid (r. 125-26/743-44), such as excessive drinking, whore-
mongering, and excessive spending, was behavior that began prior to his 
reign, including drinking wine during the Hajj.  The third fitna began at the end 
of his reign.42  While the individual actions of some Umayyad caliphs confirm 
the general claim of impiety and raucous behavior,43 the accusation of secular 
kingship, or religious non-engagement, by the Umayyad caliphs refers to the 
entirety of the Umayyad Empire. Crone and Hinds refute this claim in their 
book, God’s Caliph, whereby they demonstrate the Umayyad Caliphs’ usage 
of Islam within each of their reigns.44 Therefore, while impiety and raucous 
behavior among individual caliphs is likely genuine, the accusations of secular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
status, whereas the Umayyad caliphs later inherited the caliphate. Hawting, 
The First Dynasty of Islam The Umayyad Caliphate AD 661-750, 26. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Berkey, The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 
600-1800, 78‒79. 
42 al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVI:88. 
43 Some caliphs during the Umayyad Empire escaped this reputation. Hisham 
ibn ‘Abd al-Malik (r. 104-125/723-743) is one Umayyad caliph known within 
al-Ṭabarī’s Tārīkh, for his wisdom and piety. Donner, Muhammad and the 
Believers: At the Origins of Islam, 222. 
44 Crone and Hinds demonstrate the Islamic nature of the Umayyads through 
their titles and Islamic laws. Crone and Hinds, God’s Caliph Religious 




kingship was probably Abbasid propaganda in order to supplant Umayyad 
legitimacy with their own. 
Al-Tabari’s agenda to continually utilize the sources in order to provide 
a narrative of a singular Islamic community likely suppressed information 
regarding divergences within the religious community, with regard to its 
beliefs and practices. However, in his efforts to weave a narrative about a 
singular Islamic community, al-Tabari is simultaneously highlighting particular 
communities and rebels who are to blame for any political or religious 
divergence.  Consequently, individuals who may be labeled “heretics” are 
seen more clearly in contrast to al-Tabari’s vision of a singular Islamic 
community.  In addition, al-Tabari’s agenda confirms part of Judd’s assertion 
referenced earlier, that al-Tabari focuses more on tribal and factional divisions 
in society in order to preserve the image of the religious unity of the umma.45 
This allows al-Tabari to blame certain political or tribal parties for the 
fragmentation of the umma as opposed to any weakness inherent in Islam.  
Also, al-Tabari’s strategy of including detailed and exhaustive accounts of 
rebellions against the Umayyads as well as their “secular” rule, serves to 
explain and legitimize their downfall in contrast to the Abbasid rise to power.  
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The complexity of al-Tabari’s work produces many difficulties in 
analyzing and interpreting the text.  By containing numerous versions and 
numerous perspectives, modern scholars must read even more closely to 
interpret al-Tabari’s subtle and implicit commentary of the reports and to 
discern his specific motivations towards each event reported.  His motivation 
to compromise the contemporary political and theological schisms means that 
he wrote and interpreted the community of Islam in the early days to appear 
as a cohesive group, despite their many fitnas. Therefore, the study of heresy 
and heterodoxy is both complicated and elucidated by al-Tabari’s desires to 
demonstrate a singular Islamic community. Meanwhile, other contemporary 
commentators may carry different biases and agendas and may have 
interpreted the events differently. These accounts and agendas should be 
compared, in order to obtain an essential understanding of the events, their 
causes, and effects. 
 
Methodology I: Comparison to Other Contemporary Historians  
 The most basic and easiest methodology to employ in the 
interpretation of al-Tabari is the comparison of his specific accounts with other 




between the two historians and their agendas, but it also can provide 
additional information, missing from either account.  
 The missing or additional information or accounts provides insight not 
only into the chroniclers’ agendas, as demonstrated above, but also who had 
access to which transmitters and what information through the asānīd (chains 
of authorities) attached to the akhbār or transmitted accounts. There are 
numerous Islamic authors to choose from, all of whom focus on different 
geographic regions and have access to slightly different reports through 
different transmitters. 
For this study, the Islamic narrative author al-Baladhuri  (d. 279/892) 
and his history, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, will be utilized to enhance the discussion 
and analysis of heresy and heterodoxy in the Umayyad era. Despite his 
slightly earlier death date, his history represents similar problems to al-Tabari, 
in that he is also not contemporary with the events that he is reporting. The 
accounts that he collected and organized for Ansāb al-Ashrāf, as the title 
suggests, focus on the notables from Muhammad to the Umayyad caliphs, 
ending with some of the Abbasid caliphs. Despite the breadth of his work, he 
focuses the majority of his work on the Umayyad caliphs and only the first two 
Abbasid caliphs in their entirety.46  
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The agenda of al-Baladhuri differs from al-Tabari’s. First of all, unlike 
al-Tabari, al-Baladhuri had a patron who paid him for his work. As the 
historian at the Abbasid court, he was a tutor for al-Mutawakkil (r. 232-246/ 
847-861) and he wrote for al-Mu‘tasim (r. 227-232/842-847). There is some 
uncertainty as to the extent this affects the organization and agenda of his 
chronicle, especially when his history contains reports on Umayyad legitimacy 
and succession, which al-Tabari chose to ignore. Al-Baladhuri used reports 
from many of the same sources as al-Tabari, such as ‘Awana, and al-
Mada’ini.47  More importantly, al-Baladhuri also includes reports from al-
Tabari’s Tārīkh.48 The specific sections of al-Baladhuri that will be analyzed 
and compared to al-Tabari are coming from al-Safadi (d. 147/764) and al-
Kalbi (d. 146/763).49 
Next, al-Baladhuri seems to have structured his narrative of the 
downfall of the Umayyads in terms of religious sects, which affects how one 
will interpret the entire episode.50 This point makes al-Baladhuri an important 
chronicle for comparison purposes. Including information regarding religious 
sects or factions associated in ways other than tribal will act to guide further 
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reinterpretation of the events that both contemporary commentators 
reference. Al-Baladhuri’s work will be compared to al-Tabari’s narrative 
concerning al-Harith ibn Surayj, and a particular focus of comparison will 
concern the course of events and their terminology, based on their structures 
and agendas.  
Three additional primary resources also utilized in this paper are the 
Fihrist, The Ornaments of Histories of the Eastern Islamic Lands, and a letter 
from a collection of letters written by ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Katib (d. 132/750).51 
These sources are included in the case study and discussed separately as 
supplements to the two main narratives.  
‘Abd al-Hamid ibn Yahya al-Katib was the secretary to Marwan ibn 
Muhammad (r. 126-132/744-750), the last Umayyad Caliph.52 ‘Abd al-Hamid’s 
letters range from personal letters to his friends and family to official letters 
concerning rebellions and pilgrimage.53 The letters from ‘Abd al-Hamid raise 
certain issues of authenticity and range broadly in scope.  ‘Abd al-Hamid’s 
letters have been preserved in later sources, sometimes in as late as 
seventh/fourteenth century without a chain of transmission, which raises the 
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issue of authenticity.54 The letter concerning the “seditious activities in 
Khurasan” written to Nasr ibn Sayyar and analyzed here surfaced in the 
seventh/thirteenth century preserved in al-Balawi’s (d. 657/1258) Al-‘Aṭā’ al-
jazīl fī kashf ghaṭā’ al-tarsīl.55 Despite the length of time between ‘Abd al-
Hamid’s death and the letters’ preservation within extant sources, the 
likelihood of authenticity is quite high. First, the political views found within the 
letters represent an Umayyad perspective. The letter refers to revolutionaries 
in Khurasan, possibly al-Harith, but traditionally thought of as the Abbasids. 
Therefore, if the letter is interpreted to mean the Abbasids, the letter is 
accusing them of impious and heretic behavior.56  It is also demonstrated by 
Wadad al-Qadi that it is highly likely ‘Abd al-Hamid’s letters were preserved 
by his descendants and Abbasid secretaries, who highly respected ‘Abd al-
Hamid professionally and studied his work.   One of his sons, Isma‘il, became 
a secretary for the Abbasids57 and many more descendents studied as 
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secretaries, carrying down to his great-great-grandsons during the Tulunid 
Empire.58  
The agenda present in the letter concerning seditious activity in 
Khurasan is also analyzed by al-Qadi, who determined that since ‘Abd al-
Hamid represents the Caliph Marwan II during this specific letter, it takes an 
official tone, which produces a disconnected and reserved attitude towards 
the rebels. The caliph looked down upon the rebels and disguised his fear, 
through his condescension toward the rebels.59 Due to this contempt and 
fear, the contents of the letter stay focused on the wickedness of the rebels 
and their origins as non-Arab converts, and less on their beliefs and goals.60 
‘Abd al-Hamid’s letter represents the only contemporary source in the present 
study, with the exception of non-Muslim sources, with a purely Umayyad 
perspective on the events.   
Al-Nadim’s (d. 385/995) Fihrist, which is an extensive medieval 
compilation of titles and authors, organizes by topic a large list of medieval 
Islamic books and treatise, most of which are no longer extant. 61 This catalog 
provides an understanding, several decades after al-Tabari, of the 
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categorization of Islamic and non-Islamic groups, including heretical and 
heterodoxical groups in Islam.62 The Fihrist includes information about these 
books, most of which have been lost and cannot be analyzed first hand, 
therefore this work contextualizes authors, their associates, and most 
importantly the content of their works. This resource demonstrates how 
particular Islamic groups have been classified and understood by historians 
and the educated in the 10th century CE. While al-Nadim’s Fihrist does not 
include references to al-Harith ibn Surayj, it does contain information 
regarding some of his associates and rebels like him. This information will be 
discussed in the context of the case study.  
Al-Nadim’s Fihrist categorizes Islamic society in the fifth chapter of his 
work, entitled mutakallamūn or theologians of different Islamic sects. In this 
chapter he includes a section about the Mu‘tazila and the Murji‘a, and a 
discrete section on the Shi‘a, Imāmīyah, the Zaydīyah and others. There is a 
third section devoted to the Mujbirah and the al-Ḥashawīyah. The fourth 
section includes the Khawārij and its types, and finally the ascetics.63 Al-
Nadim is clearly categorizing religious divergences based on different 
doctrinal beliefs mainly, with some regard to religious practices. Most 
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importantly, in order to be included into his work, a movement must be well 
known enough to have numerous scholars write for that school of thought 
against other major schools and sects.64 Because of the later date of al-
Nadim’s work, he is labeling and categorizing religious movements that were 
just forming and crystallizing during the late Umayyad period.  
Lastly, the Ornament of Histories written by Abu Sa‘id ‘Abd al-Hayy ibn 
al-Dahhak ibn Mahmud Gardizi is used, because it too draws on previous 
historians’ work and incorporates some information concerning al-Harith ibn 
Surayj and his rebellion against the Umayyad Empire.  The dates of Gardizi’s 
life are unknown. However, he wrote during the early Ghaznavid Empire 
under the reign of his patron Sultan ‘Abd al-Rashid ibn Mahmud (r. ?440-
43/?1049-52).65 His chronicle begins with the Rāshidūn and ends slightly prior 
to his own patron’s reign.66 The similarity of his earlier reports to Ibn al-Athir’s 
history also indicates that the earlier information, particularly the period in 
question, may have been diffused through the lost work of Abu ‘Ali al-Husayn 
al-Sallami, Tārīkh Wulāt Khurasan. 67 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 ibn Isḥāq, The Fihrist of al-Nadīm A Tenth-Century Survey of Muslim 
Culture, 1:380‒381. 
65 Gardīzī, The Ornament of Histories A History of the Eastern Islamic Lands 
AD 650-1041 The Original Text of Abū Sa’īd  ’Abd al-Ḥayy Gardīzī, 1. 
66 Ibid., 5. 
67 Ibid., 2. 
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The agenda of Gardizi’s work is similar to that of al-Tabari’s, yet 
Gardizi’s brevity on the early eras presents a calmer, more neutral Rāshidūn 
period. 68 Gardizi, like al-Tabari, presents the Abbasids in a positive way, 
while remaining respectful of the ‘Alid factions. Meanwhile, the Umayyad 
rulers are referred to as wilāyah  (sovereign leader) and mulk (secular king), 
but never khalīfah (deputy of God69) like the Abbasids and Rāshidūn. 70 
Therefore, his work, which recounts an outline of events during the reign of 
rulers and governors chronologically, portrays Umayyad governors as equally 
lacking in religious and political legitimacy and authority, and faced with tribal 
and conflicts that lead to the religious and stable rule of the Abbasids.71    
Due to the later date of many of these sources, with the exception of 
‘Abd al-Hamid’s letter if its authenticity is to be trusted, non-Muslim sources 
will be utilized to understand how this period and events were viewed 
generally in comparison to the Islamic perspective on the events. The 
following non-Muslim sources, in addition to the Islamic sources, also 
demonstrate the circulation of historical knowledge throughout the region and 
between historiographers.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Ibid., 3. 
69 Crone and Hinds, God’s Caliph Religious Authority in the First Centuries of 
Islam, 4. 
70 Gardīzī, The Ornament of Histories A History of the Eastern Islamic Lands 






Methodology II: Comparison to Non-Muslim Sources 
In addition to the Islamic narratives, the accounts found in the case 
study will be compared with sources whose date is more contemporary to the 
events themselves, by comparing the accounts found in al-Tabari with non-
Muslim sources that describe those same events, people, and movements. 
This approach allows for more and different information about the events to 
be known, while also providing broader perspectives, possibly portraying the 
information as larger and more detached audiences may have viewed it.    
The issues that arise from relying on the information from these 
sources are different from relying solely on al-Tabari; these authors too have 
their own agenda and biases, along with difference concerning the 
transmission of information. Most importantly, as expected, sole reliance on 
non-Muslim sources is impossible due to their including fewer details 
concerning the topic of Islamic heresy during the late Umayyad period. Some 
non-Muslim sources at this time, while more contemporary with the events, 
will demonstrate different political and religious viewpoints, such as Byzantine 
Christian perspectives on the same events, people, and movements. Since 
there are both geographical and cultural differences, their interpretations will 
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vary based on how they collected the information and their personal agendas, 
such as patronage.   
Non-Muslim accounts of particular Islamic accounts of heresy will be 
used from Theophilus of Edessa’s Chronicle.72  Theophilus (d. 168/785) was 
a Syriac Christian who lived in Edessa and Baghdad. His activities in the 
Abbasid court as a scholar make him culturally and religiously reliable in 
reporting on Muslim events and personages.73 He was also alive during the 
period of the third fitna, about which his accounts, extant through Michael the 
Syrian and others, demonstrate his access to reports, even stating that he 
was a witness to “these wars.”74 According to Hoyland, the concise accounts 
and abridgment of events during the period of 106-25/724-43 hint that 
Theophilus was relying on oral reports or more limited source material, while 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Theophilus’ work is reconstructed using multiple sources who quoted 
Theophilus’ work. Therefore, the account concerning al-Harith ibn Surayj is 
essentially the same since Michael the Syrian and the Chronicle of 1234 used 
Theophilus as a common reference. In addition, because the material dealt 
with the East or Muslim ruled lands, both authors did not revise or add 
material to this account.  Michael the Syrian, Agapius of Manbij, and 
Theophanes, Theophilus of Edessa’s Chronicle and the Circulation of 
Historical Knowledge in Late Antiquity and Early Islam, 57:34‒35; Michel Le 
Syrien, Chronique De Michel Le Syrien. 
73 Michael the Syrian, Agapius of Manbij, and Theophanes, Theophilus of 
Edessa’s Chronicle and the Circulation of Historical Knowledge in Late 
Antiquity and Early Islam, 57:34. 




the accounts during the period of 125-37/743-54 are longer with a narrative.75  
Since his work is no longer extant, his works will be accessed through the 
translations of other non-Muslim chroniclers who incorporated and revised his 
reports into their own works. Among two of the extant sources being analyzed 
is Michael the Syrian and the Chronicle of 1234, which derive their 
information from the common source of Dionysius I, a closer descendant of 
Theophilus.76  
These sources will provide additional information regarding al-Harith 
ibn Surayj to be incorporated into the case study. However, since the 
information contained in these reports is limited, it will be more pertinent in the 
study of heresy and heterodoxy in Islam during the period of the third fitna 
from the perspective of non-Muslim sources. 
 
Conclusion 
The numerous and diverse primary sources that will be referenced 
throughout the study will ensure a wide range of perspectives from Umayyad 
to Ghaznavid and information regarding particular heretical movements, 
people, and events. These several sources will be compared and synthesized 
into a viable reinterpretation that attempts to strip the chroniclers of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., 57:37. 
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agendas and access as much information on the topic as possible. With a 
clear perception of the political and religious events and movements of the 
late Umayyad era, this thesis will clarify the Islamic framework of 
heresy/heterodoxy, by analyzing the categories and labels used by the 
different sources.  
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Chapter 4: Case Study: al-Harith ibn Surayj & Jahm ibn Safwan, heretics in 
the late Umayyad Era 
  
Al-Tabari’s chronicles comprise numerous accounts recounting 
rebellions, descriptions about governors and caliphs, apocalyptic signs and 
much more. This chapter will focus on one individual who was designated as 
a heretic in al-Tabari’s chronicle, specifically being labeled a hypocrite and 
unbeliever, “munāfiq” and “takfīr.”1 This chapter, relying mainly on al-Tabari’s 
account, will describe and analyze al-Harith ibn Surayj (d.128/746), a rebel 
and heretic from Khurasan of the tribe Tamīm, who rebelled against the 
Umayyad Caliph Hisham (r.104-125/723-43) and his governors in the region 
beginning in 117/735. This chapter will also describe and analyze Jahm ibn 
Safwan (d. 128 or 134/746 or 751), al-Harith’s secretary and head of the 
Jahmiyya school, who was considered a heretic (mubtada‘) according to al-
Baladhuri’s Ansāb al-Ashrāf. After analyzing the material within al-Tabari’s 
Tārīkh, the information will be confronted by al-Baladhuri’s account of the 
period, in addition to other Muslim and non-Muslim sources, as well as 
secondary literature. After comparing the account and analyzing al-Harith 
within the course of events during the late Umayyad period, this paper will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:114; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:101. 
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discuss al-Harith and Jahm’s positions in regards to Islamic heresy or 
heterodoxy. 
 
Background on al-Harith ibn Surayj 
The story of al-Harith ibn Surayj’s revolt begins during the reign of the 
Caliph Hisham, as one of numerous other revolts against the Umayyad 
caliphate preceding the turbulent period of the third fitna by almost a decade. 
The revolt begins in 116/ 734 and lasts until his death in 128/745, and the 
records of his rebellion span three volumes in the English translation of al-
Tabari’s chronicle.2  Al-Harith rebelled against several Khurasani governors 
and amirs, including ‘Asim ibn ‘Abdallah, Asad ibn ‘Abdallah, and Nasr ibn 
Sayyar al-Laythi, who later under the turbulent circumstances of the third fitna 
seeks a pardon and governorship for al-Harith.3 Al-Harith lived in Khurasan 
and was an Arab of the Tamīmī/Qays tribe.4 However, his supporters were 
mostly from the Yamanī confederation, with the Azd tribe specifically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Kister, “al-Ḥārith B. Suraydj (or ‘Umayr) B. Yazīd B. Sawā (or Sawwār) B. 
Ward B. Murra B. Sufyān B. Mudjāshi’, Abū Ḥātim”; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul 
Wa al-Mulūk, T; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T; al-Tabari, Tārīkh 
al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T. 
3 Kister, “al-Ḥārith B. Suraydj (or ‘Umayr) B. Yazīd B. Sawā (or Sawwār) B. 
Ward B. Murra B. Sufyān B. Mudjāshi’, Abū Ḥātim.” 
4 According to ‘Abd al-Maṭlib, al-Harith was likely a mawlā, or non-Arab 
convert to Islam. al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul Wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:113; Judd, 
“Gaylan al-Dimashqi: The Isolation of a Heretic in Islamic Historiography,” 
172‒173; Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 3:145.  
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mentioned as following his revolt, while his opposition, the governors, mostly 
relied on Syrian (Qaysī) soldiers in an effort to quell the uprising.5 The division 
of tribes on this issue means that the Qays and Yamanī confederations were 
not fixed parties on this issue. In this regard, al-Tabari recounts the rebellion 
of al-Harith ibn Surayj largely in a political light, emphasizing the cities and 
tribes that side with al-Harith and those cities that the governors threaten and 
bribe for support. Keeping in mind Crone’s thesis that at this point in Islamic 
history the governmental and religious sphere were practically one, al-Harith 
ibn Surayj’s rebellion should be interpreted as simultaneously political and 
religious; he requested that the governors and amirs abide by the Book of 
God, the Qur’an, and the sunna of the Prophet, while also calling for shūrā, or 
mediated councils, in the selection for the positions of the governorships and 
amirships.6 He planned to explicitly challenge the policies of the Umayyad 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:107; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:96. 
6 Crone explains that the call for the book of God and the sunna and to 
allegiance to “al-riḍā” as well as  “ij’al al-amr shūrā” in the case of al-Harith 
meant a call for an acceptable person to be appointed in the governorships 
and subgovernorships. However, Crone very keenly assumes that al-Harith 
would also call for an acceptable caliph. Two other individuals, amongst 
several others, made similar calls: al-Kirmani, once an ally of al-Harith, and 
Yazid ibn al-Muhallab, a Yamanī rebel who was also labeled an munāfiq for 
his rebellion, as al-Harith was. Crone, God’s Rule, 15; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:115; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, 
XXVII:29; Crone, “On the Meaning of the Abbasid Call to al-Riḍā,” 97‒98; 
Judd, “Reinterpreting al-Walīd B. Yazīd,” 455; Crone, “Were the Qays and 
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caliphate in a letter written to Hisham, according to al-Tabari, asking the 
caliph to “(obey) the Book of God and the sunna of His Prophet.”7 At a later 
point, he declared himself ṣāhib al-rāyāt al-sūd or “He of the Black Banners,” 
after which someone replied, “If you are the one you claim, you will tear down 
the walls of Damascus and bring the rule of the Banu Umayyah to an end.”8 
This passage is alluding to the apocalyptic mood of Islamic society at this 
time. These numerous demands, even to the caliph himself, are evidence that 
his rebellion was a serious issue, but do not indicate any religious deviation or 
perceived religious deviation from Islam. The demand for adherence to the 
religious precedent of the Prophet Muhammad and the Qur’an are commonly 
used in rebellions against the Umayyad administration in order to 
demonstrate their rejection of both the caliph and governors as illegitimate 
rulers. The proto-Shi‘a and the Khawārij are two such groups that rebelled in 
this manner. Despite al-Tabari’s focus on the political and tribal, his chronicle 
provides textual reference as to society’s perception of al-Harith as a heretic, 
in conjunction with his rebellion against the Umayyad Caliphate. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Yemen of the Umayyad Period Political Parties?,” 53; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:101, 330. 
7 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:115; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:101. 
8 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVII:30; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:331. 
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The textual reference to al-Harith’s involvement in an Islamic heresy is 
found in a poem, specifically the second of fifteen poems concerning al-Harith 
and/or his rebellion against the Umayyad Caliphate. Before analyzing the 
poem, its format and content, a brief summary of al-Harith’s rebellion up to 
this point is in order. Al-Harith was rebelling against the governor ‘Asim in the 
year 116/ 734, calling for adherence to the Book of God and the sunna of the 
Prophet. Al-Harith had just defeated Nasr ibn Sayyar, the governor of Balkh, 
and even though Nasr had more men, al-Harith took the city. After conquering 
Balkh, amongst al-Juzjan, al-Faryab, al-Talaqan, and Marw al-Rudh (see map 
on page iv), al-Harith set out to conquer the well-protected city of Marw.9  Al-
Harith was ultimately defeated at Marw, as the city was firmly under ‘Asim’s 
control, allegedly due to ‘Asim’s bribery and threats to his troops. Contributing 
to al-Harith’s defeat, several of al-Harith’s own army defected just prior to the 
battle. Al-Harith ran away and ‘Asim pursued al-Harith for a time, but 
eventually stopped. At that point many more of al-Harith’s men deserted 
him.10 Despite ‘Asim’s victory at Marw, the Caliph Hisham sent Asad ibn 
Abdallah to replace ‘Asim as governor of Khurasan.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:106; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:95. 
10 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:110; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:98. 
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Poetic Analysis in Historic Texts 
First, it should be noted that poetry is consistently intermixed in al-
Tabari’s chronicle and often occurs in numerous other pieces of prose during 
this time, including the sīra of the Prophet and hadith, due to the fact that 
poetry holds a place of utmost importance in Arab culture and history, both in 
pre-Islamic and Islamic societies. The methodology regarding analysis of 
classical Arabic poetry found within historical texts has shown that poetry is 
incorporated into the prose to demonstrate proof of facts, since poetry not 
only preserves memory, but by preserving it makes it an important event.11 
This is because of poetry’s place in Arab society; poetry is known as “…the 
repository of the Arabs.”12 In fact, as renowned scholar Roger Allen puts it, “a 
good deal of what has been preserved of the heritage of the past consists of 
what can be termed occasional poetry,” therefore important historical and 
cultural information is stored in Arabic poetry that can be useful in 
understanding groups, customs and conflicts.13  Due to the power of poetry, 
the poem relies only on the quality of the poem and not the poet’s name.14 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Stetkevych, The Poetics of Islamic Legitimacy Myth, Gender, and 
Ceremony in the Classical Arabic Ode, 50. 
12 Allen, An Introduction to Arabic Literature, 65. 
13 Ibid., 66. 
14 Stetkevych, “Umayyad Panegyric and the Poetics of Islamic Hegemony: al-
Akhṭal’s ‘Khaffa al-Qaṭīnu’ (‘Those That Dwelt with You Have Left in Haste’),” 
93‒94. 
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However, that is not to say that one should not demonstrate caution when 
analyzing the poetry, as per the gap of sources during this time period, it can 
be difficult to verify the exact date, author, and specific historical 
circumstances the poetry refers to. That being said, it is more important to 
understand how the poem is remembered, since it has been remembered, 
selected, and incorporated into this piece. As other authors have shown, 
poetry acts as proof of events and history, because poets chose to remember 
and preserve the events and period of time through memorization and verse, 
but also because poems represent valid sources of transmission and 
preservation of memory. 
 
The Poem: Authenticity 
The narrator introduces the poem with some words regarding al-Harith 
and the author. Al-Tabari attributes the poem to the governor Nasr ibn 
Sayyar, the amir of Balkh, the city that al-Harith conquered previous to his 
attempt to conquer of Marw. In the same preface, al-Tabari also alleges that 
al-Harith is a Murji’ite, a member of a political religious movement asserting 
the full Islamic status of Muslim converts in Khurasan and Transoxania, 
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based on the principle of irjā, that faith and religion rely on confession of 
belief, not tribal association, birth, or acts of religion.15 
The authenticity of the poem and its attribution to Nasr ibn Sayyar 
should be considered, especially in the context of the other poems referenced 
concerning al-Harith. The assertion that Nasr ibn Sayyar composed this poem 
specifically regarding al-Harith cannot and should not be confirmed at this 
time. In fact, it is more likely that this poem was not composed about al-
Harith, since it does not specify him by name or any other specifics unique to 
his time or place, unlike the other six poems found in the 25th volume of al-
Tabari’s English translation, concerning al-Harith.16 Of the six other poems 
concerning al-Harith in this volume, three of them mention al-Harith by name, 
and three mention specific people, places, or tribes related to his story. The 
poem in question, found in Arabic in Appendix A and English in Appendix B, 
does not identify any parties. Despite the fact that this poem is possibly not 
written by Nasr ibn Sayyar about al-Harith, the most significant information is 
that al-Tabari attributes the poem to him and places it in this position in his 
chronicle. Therefore, even if al-Tabari is aware that this information is false or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See discussion in chapter one. Judd, “Gaylan al-Dimashqi: The Isolation of 
a Heretic in Islamic Historiography,” 173; Madelung, “Murdji’a.” 
16 This volume of al-Tabari’s Tārīkh is the first volume, in the translated 
version of the text, that mentions al-Harith and his revolts. al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T. 
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uncertain, he found it to be pertinent to and informative of al-Harith’s story of 
rebellion and how he was perceived, and he also saw it as providing 
verification and support for his narrative.  
Al-Tabari’s attribution of the poem to Nasr ibn Sayyar becomes even 
more intriguing later in the chronicle as al-Tabari addresses who is in the 
position to condemn people as heretics in terms of this situation. Al-Tabari 
includes a speech of Nasr ibn Sayyar’s in the context of his governorship of 
Khurasan.17 In the beginning of his governorship, he faced a crisis wherein he 
did not handle it well and faced the dissatisfaction of many.18 In his speech he 
begins, “Verily, I am one who pronounces (people) unbelievers (inī mukaffir) 
and, further, who tells (them) when they are doing wrong…..Indeed you are 
striving to attain your ends but deliberately arousing discord (fitna) in so 
doing.”19 While this is addressed to the inhabitants of Khurasan and inserted 
in a different context, it seems that Nasr believes that he, as a governor and 
Umayyad administrator, is in the position to denounce heretics as part of his 
duties and responsibilities, thereby assuming the responsibility of preventing 
fitna or discord within the community. Nasr’s perceived ability to label 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVI:221; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:285. 
18 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVI:222; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:285. 
19 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVI:222; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:286. 
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apostates could be seen as anachronistic, since his poem condemning al-
Harith as a heretic came prior to his appointment as governor of Khurasan. 
However, it seems as though any commanding position in the Umayyad 
administration, for example an amir of Balkh, may have been sufficient 
enough to condemn or threaten to condemn as in this case, someone as a 
heretic, in an effort to preserve the umma. This may lend more credence to 
Nasr ibn Sayyar as the author of the poem, and the possibility that political 
authorities appointed by the caliph were able to condemn heretics, thereby 
exercising religious authority as well.  
 
The Poem: Format and Style 
The poem is not a full qaṣīdah, but rather a qiṭ‘ah, a shorter version 
with only one or two of the typical Arabic genres or themes per poem. It has a 
rhyme- scheme of final nūn throughout the twenty-line poem. The major topic 
of the poem is Islam and the religious life, and associated with this the poem 
embraces two classical Arabic literary genres, both common in pre-Islamic 
and early Islamic poetry: first zuhdiyyah or homiletic poetry and also hijā or 
invective poetry.20 It begins with guidelines and mandates on how to life 
righteously: “Leave behind you a worldly life and a family you are going to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Allen, An Introduction to Arabic Literature, 91,119. 
	    100	  
leave.”21 This is one of numerous lines that demonstrate a command for 
asceticism and a path away from the worldly and towards the spiritual. Also, 
the Qur’anic reference to the Day of Judgment within the poem on line fifteen, 
“Your delay [of judgment] has pushed you together with polytheism in a 
coupling,” is another common reference for the zuhdiyyah genre, which 
asserts that Judgment Day is inevitable.22 The topic of heresy and the genre 
of homiletic poetry seem like a good combination, as advising others to pious 
behavior includes proper beliefs. However, the hijā, or invective theme is 
important in the poetic combination, due to the condemnation that the 
invective genre infuses on the topic of heresy.23   
While the hijā genre appears to be more of a subgenre in this poem, it 
is still a very important part of the poem, since it condemns and ridicules 
heretics and polytheists. While the most common forms of Arabic invective 
poetry center on the theme of muruwwah, or manliness and the honor of 
women, there are other examples of hijā poetry that condemn the lack of 
religiosity among a certain tribe. Specifically, the poem by Bashshar (d. 
167/784) insults a tribe for its utilization and incorporation of non-Arab 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:113; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:100. 
22 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:114; Allen, An Introduction 
to Arabic Literature, 119; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:101. 
23 Allen, An Introduction to Arabic Literature, 120. 
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converts, whom Bashshar views as “sin-children.”24 This also speaks to the 
mood of derision against non-Arab converts around that same time, which al-
Harith chose to combat as evidenced by his association with the Murji’a.   
Based on the introduction of the poem, al-Harith is the subject of this 
poem’s derision, although the poem addresses numerous different parties 
throughout its many lines, a tactic not unfamiliar to Islamic poetry.25 
Therefore, the motivation for derision is the religiosity and piety of hypocrites, 
“How far they have deviated from what they say!”26 In the previous quote, 
Nasr ibn Sayyar, the attributed author of the piece, criticizes “those who think 
for themselves” and deviate from what they presume to follow.27 He continues 
his diatribe against the heretics, by claiming they have postponed their Day of 
Judgment and because of that have become polytheists. “Leave the doubter 
seduced [by the rebelliousness]. Your delay [in judgment] has pushed you 
together with polytheism in a coupling, so that you are a people of polytheism 
and delayers [of judgment at the same time].”28 The second half of the bayt in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid., 92. 
25 Stetkevych, The Poetics of Islamic Legitimacy Myth, Gender, and 
Ceremony in the Classical Arabic Ode, 80‒81. 
26 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:114; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:101. 
27 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:114; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:101. 
28 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:114; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:101. 
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lines fourteen and fifteen therefore means that the doubter is seduced into 
rebellion against the caliphate, God’s political and religious institution on 
earth. By rebelling against the caliphate, the doubter, whom we presume to 
be al-Harith, is delaying Judgment Day, because he continues to fight against 
the will of God, which is embodied by the Umayyad Caliphate. The situation is 
framed by Islam’s absolute monotheism, an attribute that began at the 
inception of Islam. By rebelling against the caliphate, he is introducing a 
political and religious opponent to the Islamic system. Therefore, he is 
introducing a partner to God, by introducing an opponent to the established 
caliphal system.  Al-Harith is  “…aimed at polytheism for Islam [against God- 
religiously] and the world [God’s Caliphate- politically].”29 Nasr repeats in 
other words the invective claiming the people are polytheists in line sixteen: 
“For your religion has been tied to polytheism (bil-shirk).”30 Keeping in mind 
how embedded Islam and monotheism are in society, calling someone a 
polytheist would be a severe affront to his or her reputation as a Muslim.31 
The last two lines of the poem also exhibit the invective style: “Do you 
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Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:101. 
30 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:114; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:101. 
31 The inscriptions found on the Dome of the Rock demonstrate importance 
and strict definition of monotheism. Donner, Muhammad and the Believers: At 
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[people] fault us, lying about it, [saying that We are between] extremist and 
oppressor? What is among us is enough for me! He among those of you 
whom God afflicted first abstained [from God], [Being afflicted with] hypocrisy, 
He did not afflict us.”32 In these two lines, Nasr is condemning al-Harith as a 
liar and a hypocrite, someone who spreads lies about God’s religio-political 
establishment on earth and claims to be a believing and practicing Muslim, 
but instead follows his own desires, lying about the pious and righteous 
followers of Islam while asserting his own righteousness.  
 
The Poem: Content Analysis  
It is within the invective portion of the poem that Nasr ibn Sayyar 
utilizes the Arabic terms for heresy: nafaqa and takfīr, thereby implying that 
al-Harith, the stated subject of the poem, is a heretic. The first term utilized is 
takffiru and it is found in line eleven of the poem. Nasr states, “And slay their 
follower among us and their helper, sometimes declaring them unbelievers, 
and curse them sometimes.”33 As discussed in the second chapter, the word 
takfīr means to apostatize or declare a person an unbeliever or non-Muslim. 
Based on this verse Nasr ibn Sayyar believes that some of al-Harith’s 
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followers are kāfirs or unbelievers, but some of them should not be declared 
such. In the lines preceding this, Nasr instructs his audience to struggle 
against those people who do not “hope for an afterlife,” and do not “offer 
Islamic worship.”34 Therefore, the followers referenced in line eleven refer to 
the followers of a person or people who are not Muslim in this regard. Nasr is 
therefore accusing al-Harith of being the leader of such a group or one of its 
many followers, who threaten the good and righteous Muslims.   
 At the end of the poem, Nasr uses the second term, nafaqa, which 
generally means heresy or more specifically hypocrisy.  This condemnation is 
comprised of two lines, first condemning al-Harith and his followers as liars 
and following it up with the insult of hypocrite. “Do you [people] fault us, lying 
about it, [saying that we are between] extremist and oppressor? What is 
among us is enough for me! He is among those of you whom God afflicted,  
[who] first abstained [from God], [Being afflicted with] hypocrisy, He did not 
afflict us.”35 First, Nasr is claiming that lies have been spread regarding those 
righteous Muslims or presumably those who represent the Umayyad Empire 
and its administration. Evidence suggests this is due to the mention of Nasr’s 
group being considered as “oppressors” or “extremists,” and it is easy to 
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35 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:114; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:114. 
	    105	  
consider that the Umayyad administration would be in a position that might be 
considered oppressive or extreme. Nasr solidifies his position within that 
camp by expressing his confidence in this position, despite the lies spoken 
about “them,” the Muslims who have not manipulated Islam.  In the last line, 
Nasr claims that the first of those that God afflicted with hypocrisy refused, or 
denied, but he neglects to say what this person refused. According to Lane’s 
Arabic-English Lexicon the verb ya’bah means to  “refuse, refrain, forebore, 
abstain or hold back.”36 Therefore, the text can be read two ways, first he 
could be refusing being afflicted with hypocrisy, thereby trying to assert that 
he is not a hypocrite or it seems that al-Harith, if he is supposed to be the 
“first” whom God afflicts with hypocrisy, has refrained from the community of 
good and righteous Muslims. Consequently, their actions, for example their 
lies and hypocrisy, demonstrate that they fall in with the other “polytheists.”  
In addition to the traditional Arabic terms for heretic, other Arabic 
words and phrases found within the poem composed by Nasr ibn Sayyar 
demonstrate the author’s perception of al-Harith as a heretic. He asks 
Muslims to “struggle” (using the Arabic word jihād) against those who are not 
actually Muslims, i.e., “those who do not hope for an afterlife” and “those who 
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do not offer Islamic worship.”37 He also refers to this group as “those finding 
fault with us regarding our religion, who are the worst followers of religion.”38 
Nasr ibn Sayyar continues on this subject and while he does not explicitly use 
al-Harith’s name within the poem, it is clear from the introduction that it fits al-
Harith and his followers.  After identifying these lesser signs that brand them 
heretics Nasr further explains their heretical actions: they follow their desires, 
claiming it is God’s will and they are “seduced [by the rebelliousness].”39 
Therefore, al-Harith and his followers claim they follow God’s path, but 
instead they follow their own selfish desires, claiming it is God’s will. This 
most certainly refers back to al-Harith’s conquest of Balkh, when he asserted 
that the Book of God and the sunna of the Prophet were not being followed 
and that their precedence should be returned.40  
Another intriguing part of Nasr’s poem is when he links the polytheism 
of religion to the “associationism” of politics and rule, in regard to al-Harith’s 
rebellion. Nasr is therein demonstrating the connection between caliph and 
God and the fusion of religion and politics within the caliphate institution, while 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:114; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:101. 
38 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:114; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:101. 
39 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:114; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:101. 
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also revealing the importance of monotheism or the singularity within both.41  
Therefore, al-Harith’s rebellion is a rebellion against the political institution of 
the caliphate, but also against God, by dividing his community. Nasr 
demonstrates this aversion to polytheism in both spheres through his 
numerous references to shirk or “association,” as in the association of beings 
or objects with the one God. By daring to present himself as a political 
alternative to the caliph, al-Harith is at the same time introducing a challenge 
to God and the imported concept of single political rule as caliph in his name. 
While the phenomenon of rebellion and securing of the position of caliph 
occurred at least twice before, al-Harith’s rebellion differs from Ibn al-Zubayr’s 
(r. 61-72/681-692) rebellion and counter caliphate,42 since he offered no 
personal, tribal, or familial connection to the Prophet Muhammad and 
therefore did not cultivate religious legitimacy before his revolt concluded. 
Therefore, this poem expresses quite beautifully, but simply, all the reasons 
that al-Harith’s rebellion makes him a heretic within the Islamic world and not 
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Islam, 21. 
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just a political opponent.  Al-Baladhuri also describes al-Harith’s revolt within 
his Ansāb al-Ashrāf, while providing new details concerning the religious 
program associated with al-Harith’s uprising. 
 
Al-Harith in al-Baladhuri 
While al-Tabari covers al-Harith’s rebellion, al-Baladhuri spends more 
time describing his secretary and theologian, Jahm ibn Safwan (d. 128/746). 
However, al-Baladhuri does focus solely on al-Harith in two places. First, 
focusing on al-Harith’s death, he refers to al-Harith in relation to the Abbasid 
revolution and the factionalism/tribalism that was perpetrated by Abu Muslim 
on behalf of the Abbasids.43 Secondly, he details al-Harith’s revolt and 
campaign against Nasr ibn Sayyar.44  
In the first section, al-Baladhuri confirms that al-Harith was fighting 
Juday’ al-Kirmani, previously his ally, at the same time as Nasr ibn Sayyar 
was fighting him in Khurasan. The dispute pertained to tribal factionalism, 
which was intensified by Abu Muslim.45  However al-Harith was killed by al-
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Kirmani and crucified by Nasr.46 Al-Harith’s death will be analyzed later in the 
study.  
The second section pertaining to al-Harith is mostly some excerpts 
from al-Tabari’s Tārīkh. The selection chosen from al-Tabari’s chronicle refers 
to al-Harith’s uprising against Nasr ibn Sayyar after Marwan II had become 
the caliph. While al-Tabari includes a lengthy report concerning the entire 
revolt, al-Baladhuri seems only concerned with aspects of the story that 
include Jahm ibn Safwan, al-Harith’s secretary and leader of the Jahmiyya.47 
These sections of the report also refer to the ideology behind the revolt. Al-
Harith is calling for the rule of consultation (shūrā), a call for the people to 
choose their own governor as opposed to appointment by the caliph.48 Nasr 
refuses and to stir up support for his cause, al-Harith has his secretary Jahm 
ibn Safwan read al-Harith’s “program” or sīrah to the people. With the 
people’s reaction, Nasr eventually agreed to arbitration, which ended in an 
agreement that Nasr should abdicate. However, Nasr refused. Al-Baladhuri 
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ends the passage with Jahm’s capture and murder by one of the Tamīmī 
tribe49 after al-Harith rejects Nasr as leader of the prayer. 50  
Since al-Baladhuri’s report is excerpted from al-Tabari’s Tārīkh, the 
only comparison that can be made is which sections he chose to include. 
These are clearly those that refer to Jahm and by doing this he elucidates the 
ideology of the revolt, though not specific beliefs. One can guess that Jahm 
would be spreading his own religious beliefs, which are documented 
elsewhere in al-Baladhuri’s Ansāb al-Ashrāf, and will be discussed later in the 
paper. While not strictly specifying al-Harith’s rebellion, ‘Abd al-Hamid’s letter 
on behalf of Caliph Marwan II concerning sedition in Khurasan provides an 
Umayyad perspective on the rebellions in the region.  
‘Abd al-Hamid’s Letter: Sedition in Khurasan 
 As discussed previously, Abd al-Hamid’s letter, internally dated from 
the year 128/74651 is traditionally interpreted as referring to Abu Muslim’s (d. 
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mentioned in a confrontation with Nasr. al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-
Mulūk, T, XXVII:29; Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 3:145; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:330.  
50 Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 25:57; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-
Mulūk, T, XXVII:28‒35; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:329‒335. 
51 al-Kātib, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Bin Yaḥyā wa Mā Tabaqqā Min Rasā’ilihī wa 
Rasā’il Sālim Abī al-’Alā’, 201. 
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137/755) involvement in the Abbasid revolution in Khurasan slightly later than 
al-Harith’s rebellion. However, the lack of specifics within the letter, in addition 
to the date, makes it possible that it refers to al-Harith’s populist revolt rather 
than Abu Muslim’s rebellion. First, the date of 128/746 comes at the height of 
al-Harith’s rebellion, just prior to his death, while Abu Muslim did not declare 
his revolt until the end of 129/748.52 Al-Qadi’s concerns that this cannot refer 
to al-Harith and Juday‘ al-Kirmani refer to details of the letter that call for them 
to be associated with the ‘Alid movement, their corruption of the Qur’an and 
calling for a leader from ahl al-bayt.53  While there is no evidence from either 
al-Baladhuri or al-Tabari that al-Harith advocated for a ruler from ahl al-bayt, 
al-Tabari’s reports do indicate he called for adherence to the Book of God, 
wherein he was striving for an acceptable candidate for the governorships 
and likely caliphate.  While al-Harith’s rebellion never specifically called for a 
ruler from ahl al-bayt, which normally indicated an ‘Alid, Crone demonstrates 
in her article “Abbasid Call to al-Riḍā” that a call for al-riḍā min ahl al-bayt, 
simply meant appointing an acceptable person as caliph.54 Al-Qadi also 
emphasizes that the movement to which the letter refers indicates a non-Arab 
rebel with a non-Arab following, but the reasoning behind this is not clear from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 al-Qadi, “The Earliest ‘Nabita’ and the Paradigmatic ‘Nawabit’,” 37. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Meanwhile, al-Harith’s one time ally, al-Kirmani, did call for “al-riḍā min ahl 
al-bayt.”  Crone, “On the Meaning of the Abbasid Call to al-Riḍā,” 102‒103. 
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her article. However, his association as a Murji’ite, an advocate for non-Arab 
converts to Islam, may support this notion. In addition, the letter sent by 
Marwan II seems to have no preceding letter or response from Nasr, 
therefore Marwan II could have received information about al-Harith and al-
Kirmani mixed with Abu Muslim’s propaganda,55 confusing the two and 
therefore including information on both.56 Regardless of some 
inconsistencies, the letter seems pertinent to the study of al-Harith and heresy 
in general.  
The letter discusses a group described as nawābit, which al-Qadi 
defines as “the sprouters,” or a rapid populist movement of lowly non-Arab 
converts in Khurasan.57 The word occurs only once in the letter, but is 
associated with lies about the Prophet Muhammad and the Qur’an and more 
significantly “disbelief” or al-kufr.58 The term kufr is used twice in the letter, 
referring to the rebels in Khurasan. The first occurrence of the word is found 
in the introduction, adjacent to the term nābita. Al-Qadi translates: “Of the 
sprouting of the nābita in the land of Khurasan, there has been that with 
which God has wanted to abase the people of ingratitude (ahl al-kufr), to His 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Abu Muslim was also calling for “al-riḍā min ahl al-bayt.” Ibid., 103. 
56 al-Qadi, “The Earliest ‘Nabita’ and the Paradigmatic ‘Nawabit’,” 37. 
57 Ibid., 32, 34, 43, 45. 
58 Ibid., 32‒33. 
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blessing(s) and rejection to his [just] due.”59 Just as al-Qadi translated it, this 
seems to be a general accusation of ingratitude for rebellions in the region 
rather than any accusation of heretical actions or beliefs. The letter next 
explains some of the heretical beliefs of the rebels. Among those are a call for 
a descendent of the Prophet as the ruler, a condemnation of the caliphs 
including and after ‘Uthman (r. 23-35/644-656) and the accusation that they 
“renounced the entirety of the Revelation, corrupting what they had 
[previously] accepted.”60 Of the three factors that Marwan II outlines, there is 
at least some evidence that al-Harith satisfies two of them: he is using the 
Qur’an to support his rebellion, likely interpreting it to satisfy his vision, and he 
disapproves of the Umayyad caliphs, which is a stance of the Murji’ites.61 
There is not even the slightest evidence that al-Harith supports an ‘Alid ruler. 
However, according to Gardizi, al-Harith’s ally, al-Kirmani, was “an adherent 
of the party (shi‘a, sc. of the Abbasids).”62 The second usage of the term al-
kufr occurs in the middle of the letter, detailing one of the weaknesses of the 
rebel leader’s tactics. He did not want the movement to alienate people or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Ibid., 32. 
60 The fact that ‘Uthmān was still able to be criticized during the late Umayyad 
period demonstrates that the Rāshidūn, as a concept, had not yet been 
formed. Ibid., 33. 
61 See the discussion of the Murji’ites in chapter one. Cook, Early Muslim 
Dogma. 
62 Gardīzī, The Ornament of Histories A History of the Eastern Islamic Lands 
AD 650-1041 The Original Text of Abū Sa’īd  ‘Abd al-Ḥayy Gardīzī, 27. 
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else he, as Al-Qadi translates, “would have revealed of the manifold forms of 
disbelief (al-kufr), the great calumny and unsavory egotism and the partaking 
in monstrosities, what the living wish they were dead with.”63  This quote 
suggests that Marwan II did not or could not know the exact nature of his 
heresy; simply stated the rebellion against the Umayyad caliphate was 
enough to garner the label, further supporting the connection between 
political and religious orthodoxies within Islam. Further evidence of al-Harith’s 
weak strategy in order to not alienate people can be found in al-Tabari’s 
reports on al-Harith.64 
While the confusion remains regarding whom specifically this letter 
was referring to, this letter has informed the concept and declaration of 
heretics under Marwan II’s rule and is consistent with Nasr’s statement 
concerning heretics, as discussed above. First, the information that Marwan II 
had was likely confused due to the multiple rebels in Khurasan at the time, 
thereby including some information about al-Harith’s rebellion. Second, the 
lack of specifics in the letter indicates that Marwan II is likely condemning all 
and any rebellion in Khurasan as heresy. Gardizi also lends some information 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 al-Qadi, “The Earliest ‘Nabita’ and the Paradigmatic ‘Nawabit’,” 33. 
64  When al-Harith was trying to push Nasr from power, al-Harith’s tribe 
confronted al-Harith and accused him of scattering their unity. Al-Harith 
replied that his plan was for Nasr to rule, but al-Kirmani would assume the 
governorship. al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVII:29; al-Tabari, 
Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:330. 
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associated with al-Harith and his rebellion in Khurasan, as it is relates to the 
governors and sub-governors of the Khurasan and Iraq.   
 
Al-Harith in Gardizi 
Gardizi’s information concerning al-Harith is quite short and follows 
much of the same narrative as al-Tabari as it concerns al-Harith and his 
rebellion. Prior to his retreat to Turkestan, he rebelled and controlled 
Guzganan, Talaqan, Faryab, and Marw al-Rud. While Gardizi makes no 
mention of al-Harith’s heresy, he does a summary outline of the beliefs and 
principles of al-Harith’s rebellion. “He led his movement on the basis of the 
Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet and displayed opposition to the 
Marwanids. He gave out that the “Protected Peoples” should observe the 
conditions of their dhimmī status, that he would not take land-tax from the 
Muslims and that he would not act unjustly towards anyone.”65 According to 
Gardizi, he had many followers, before his defeat by Asad at Tirmidh and his 
retreat to Turkestan.66 
 Once Walid II died and Yazid III took the caliphate, Yazid  III ordered 
Nasr ibn Sayyar, governor of Khurasan, to give al-Harith a “grant of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Gardīzī, The Ornament of Histories A History of the Eastern Islamic Lands 
AD 650-1041 The Original Text of Abū Sa’īd  ‘Abd al-Ḥayy Gardīzī, 25. 
66 Ibid., 26. 
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protection.”67  However, with the rise of Marwan II, al-Harith allied with al-
Kirmani, who later associated with the ‘Alids, and Abu Muslim of the Abbasid 
revolution, against Nasr. However, al-Harith died, and the battles against 
Nasr continued with al-Kirmani’s alliance with Abu Muslim.68 Al-Baladhuri’s 
reports contain more information regarding the ideology behind al-Harith’s 
rebellion. The non-Muslim sources also contain information regarding al-
Harith and his rebellion, even though they do not label him a heretic. 
 
Non-Muslim Sources on al-Harith 
Limited information concerning al-Harith’s revolts appears in non-
Muslim sources. Al-Harith’s revolt takes place in the year 126/744, and this 
period contains limited and concise accounts of major events in Muslim 
society.69  The report from Theophanes notes the murder of al-Walid II and 
the seizure of the Caliphate by Yazid III (r. 126/744).70 Within Agapius’ work, 
another extant transmitter of Theophilus’ work, the reasoning for the murder 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Ibid., 27. 
68 Ibid., 27‒28. 
69 Michael the Syrian, Agapius of Manbij, and Theophanes, Theophilus of 
Edessa’s Chronicle and the Circulation of Historical Knowledge in Late 
Antiquity and Early Islam, 57:29. 
70 Ibid., 57:245‒248. 
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concerns Yazid’s religious sect, the Qadariyya.71 Yazid III’s association with 
the Qadariyya,72 and al-Walid II’s dislike of the group, are also mentioned in 
al-Tabari’s Tārīkh.73 Other chronicles, which built off the work of Theophilus, 
explain the murder of al-Walid II in terms of his impious behavior, which 
garnered the hatred of other Umayyad princes.74  
The sources also have varying degrees of explicitness concerning the 
death and decapitation of al-Walid II. Michael the Syrian, Agapius, and the 
Chronicle of 1234 all contain similar somewhat detailed accounts of al-Walid’s 
death and the procession of his head and body.75 The three sources then go 
on to explain the political divisions in the community that occurred after the 
death of al-Walid II. While Agapius simply mentions that the Arabs were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Although the original source has Badriyyah, this is thought to be an error. 
Ibid., 57:245. 
72 The Qadariyya is a religious group that believes in the human free will and 
not predestination. Because of this, they did not have to blindly trust that the 
person in the position of Caliph was predestined by God to hold the office. 
Instead, belief in free will allowed people to hold the Caliph accountable for 
his actions. Ibid. 
73 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVI:129; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:232. 
74 Michael the Syrian and the Chronicle of 1234 explain the murder of al-
Walid II in terms of Abbas’ desire for power and al-Walid’s impious behavior. 
Michael the Syrian, Agapius of Manbij, and Theophanes, Theophilus of 
Edessa’s Chronicle and the Circulation of Historical Knowledge in Late 
Antiquity and Early Islam, 57:246‒247. 
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“troubled and divided and their opinions were split,” the other two sources go 
into slightly more detail.76  
Al-Harith ibn Surayj is then mentioned by the name Bar Sarigi in the 
Chronicle of 1234 and Michael the Syrian as one in a list of many people 
battling for power in different regions of the Umayyad Empire. In both 
accounts, al-Harith is described as the person battling for power in the 
Khurasan region of the Empire, which confirms that al-Harith, along with other 
rebels, represented a serious threat to the political and religious unity of the 
Umayyad Empire.77 However, the two accounts do not assign al-Harith a sect 
of followers, as they do with two of the others listed. Among the followers 
listed are the “Mūrgāye,” likely Murji’a in Arabic, associated with Sa’id ibn 
Bahdal (d. 127/745).78 However, Sa’id ibn Bahdal is known as a Khawārij, and 
al-Harith had connections to the Murji’a through his secretary Jahm. 
Therefore, it is likely that this error occurred in the transmission of reports 
from chronicler to chronicler or within the initial report to Theophilus.79  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Ibid., 57:246. 
77 Ibid., 57:246‒248. 
78 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVII:10; Hoyland, Seeing Islam 
As Others Saw It A Survey and Evaluation of Christian, Jewish and 
Zoroastrian Writings on Early Islam, 661; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-
Mulūk, O, 7:316‒317. 
79 Hoyland, Seeing Islam As Others Saw It A Survey and Evaluation of 
Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian Writings on Early Islam, 661. 
	    119	  
The limited amount of information focusing solely on this period and 
the rebellions that ensued confirms that al-Harith was a major competitor for 
political and religious power in Khurasan, but does not label him or his 
brethren heretics and it neglects the fact that his rebellion started much earlier 
than the death of al-Walid II; in fact he began his revolt under the Caliph 
Hisham, in 116/734. Al-Walid II was murdered by Yazid III in 126/744 and al-
Harith died in 128/746.80 It is likely many of the other rebels began their 
revolts prior to the death of al-Walid II as well, making Yazid III’s 
assassination of al-Walid II one of opportunity, in addition to jealousy and 
theological principle.   
 
Other Symbols/Indications of Heresy 
Other textual evidence of al-Harith’s heresy is based on the literary 
interpretation and analysis of heretical behavior and punishments that are 
employed in Arabic literature and parallel stories about other established 
heretics in early Islamic history. In order to draw parallels in the ways their 
stories were written, however, this assumes two premises, first that al-Harith 
ibn Sa’id al-Kadhdhab (d. 79/698) was a man who gathered a following as a 
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Prophet in Syria, during the reign of ‘Abd al-Malik. Due to his failed attempt as 
a Prophet, became the quintessential heretic within the literary memory of the 
Islamic tradition. The similarities between al-Harith ibn Sa’id al-Kadhdhab and 
al-Harith ibn Surayj represent literary tropes that identify them as heretics 
within Islamic memory.  
  The first major symbol of heretical behavior is the punishment. The 
alleged heretic is sentenced to: arrest and crucifixion. Al-Harith al-Kadhdhab, 
a heretic claiming prophethood during the reign of ‘Abd al-Malik, represents 
an appropriate example of how heretics were apprehended and punished; he 
was arrested and crucified in 79/698, for portraying himself as a prophet and 
leading Muslims astray.81 Al-Harith al-Kadhdhab tried to hide himself in a 
crevice, which Anthony demonstrates is a literary topos, negatively comparing 
al-Harith with Jesus, who also hid himself in a wall in the Isra’iliyyāt.82 In the 
story of Jesus, the angel Gabriel saved Jesus from those pursuing them. 
However, in the story of al-Harith al-Kadhdhab, he is found by his pursuers, 
as evidence that he lacks the divine connection that he claims to have as a 
prophet, but that Jesus demonstrated.83 The story of al-Harith ibn Surayj’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Anthony, “The Prophecy and Passion of al-Ḥārith B. Sa’īd al-Kadhdhāb: 
Narrating a Religious Movement from the Caliphate of  ‘Abd al-Malik B. 
Marwān,” 2. 
82 Ibid., 23. 
83 Ibid. 
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demise also follows this trope, though it is slightly different. He too was 
crucified for his heresy, but his death took place near Marw, when he was 
killed in battle by decapitation in 128/746.84 Therefore his elimination and an 
end of his revolt were not enough; his death had to be visible both with the 
separation of his head from body and then displayed through crucifixion.  
Prior to his capture and death, he “bore a hole in the wall,” (fathalma fī 
thulmah) and when the fighting grew heated, he and some of his followers 
used the hole to escape the fighting. Despite his flight preparations, he was 
caught, killed, and crucified.85 This may seem more like a coincidence than 
following literary topoi of a heretic. However, the reference to his use of holes 
and crevices are numerous prior to al-Harith’s death. Prior to his death, he 
used a hole in a wall, naqab, to enter and attack Marw.86   His death came at 
the hands of al-Kirmani and his followers, who had disputes both with Nasr 
ibn Sayyar and al-Harith.87  
Another similarity between heretics is the laqab or nickname given to 
the two historical figures. Al-Harith ibn Surayj’s full name is al-Harith ibn 
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Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:333. 
85 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVII:42‒43; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:340. 
86 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVII:32; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:331‒332. 
87 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVI:220‒221; al-Tabari, Tārīkh 
al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:284‒285. 
	    122	  
‘Umayr ibn Yazid ibn Sawa ibn Ward ibn Murra ibn Sufyan ibn Mujashi‘, Abu 
Hatim.88 While it is possible that his father’s name was Surayj, Surayj could 
also means “little liar.”89 A parallel of this laqab is found within al-Harith al-
Kadhdhab’s story as well. Al-Kadhdhab also means “liar.”90  Within the 
Qur’an,  the concept of lying is also fundamentally connected with the concept 
of disbelief and polytheism.91 Lying is associated with denying the truth of 
God, but while the term kadhaba, to lie knowing it is false, is prominent in the 
Qur’an, the root s-r-j, is not found at all.92  
Another piece of evidence for al-Harith ibn Surayj’s heresy, which is 
found in other examples of heretical individuals, is the affiliation with other 
historical figures with heretical and rebellious reputations in Islamic history. 
While there is not much information concerning al-Harith’s associations with 
heretical religious scholars or judges, al-Harith has one specific negative 
association found in the chronicle of al-Tabari. He is associated with Jahm ibn 
Safwan (d. 128/746), who was his secretary in Khurasan during his rebellion.  
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Jahm is known for his promotion of a type of religious agnosticism, in 
that he advocates the concept of a God who cannot be known to humans.93  
Jahm’s doctrine of agnosticism, at least within later sources, is considered 
much more extreme than al-Harith ibn Surayj. It denies the caliph the right to 
rule in the name of God, since he asserts that God’s will cannot be known, for 
He, “is not a thing that can be known to us.”94  Its connection to the Murji’a 
school of thought can be recognized, but it should be noted that these 
religious movements, at least within later sources, seem to be completely 
separate. Al-Harith is associated with the Murji’a, which also drains the 
religious authority from the caliphate, because the Murji’a believe that faith is 
simply a confession of belief, thereby the concept of who is a Muslim under 
this school lies firmly with the individual. The name of the Murji’a school is 
morphologically related to the Qur’anic term irjā’, which means, “to defer 
judgment,” to God, yet simultaneously “uphold justice against contemporary 
rulers.”95 Yet, the concept of irjā’, while complex and controversial, was not as 
extreme as Jahm’s agnosticism. The Murji’a did not claim that God was 
unknowable. According to Jahm, however, all rational knowledge of God is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Griffel, “Agnosticism.” 
94 Ibid. 
95 Madelung, “Murdji’a.” 
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baseless, including the Qur’an, which he believed was created rather than 
being coexistent with God.96  
The literature concerning whether Jahm is a heretic is split. Al-Tabari 
does not label Jahm a heretic, but does mention his school or following of 
Jahmiyya.97  It is also clear from al-Nadim’s Fihrist that Jahm believed in the 
createdness of the Qur’an and wrote a treatise about it, which Abu al-Hudhayl 
al-‘Allaf (d. 849/850), a Mu‘tazilite,98 wrote against.99 It is on Jahm ibn Safwan, 
his religious doctrines, and his association with al-Harith that al-Baladhuri 
writes explicitly.   
 Al-Baladhuri, in contrast to al-Tabari, refers to Jahm ibn Safwan as an 
outright heretic and details information about Jahm alongside other men, 
whom he refers to as “innovator” or mubtada‘.100  Al-Baladhuri refers to 
Jahm’s beliefs as “his shameful innovation” or bid‘a al-qabīḥah, “that killed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Griffel, “Agnosticism.” 
97 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVII:29, 35; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:330, 335. 
98 The Fihrist states that Abu al-Hudhayl opposes Jahm ibn Safwan on the 
issue of the createdness of the Qur’an, but is not explicit on his stance. His 
association as a Mu‘tazilite does not necessitate his belief in a created 
Qur’an, as the beliefs among Mu‘tazilites were diverse. ibn Isḥāq, The Fihrist 
of al-Nadīm A Tenth-Century Survey of Muslim Culture, 1:388‒389. 
99 Ibid., 1:387‒389. 
100 Mubtada‘ is one of the Arabic words referring to heretic. See chapter two. 
Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 25:54. 
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him in the year 133/751.”101  This is five years later than al-Tabari records it, 
which was 128/746, the same year that al-Harith is recorded to have died.  
Due to the fact that al-Baladhuri focuses on religious struggles and 
divergences, in addition to tribal affiliations, he explains the innovations within 
Islam that Jahm subscribed to, all of which are related to the concept of 
predestination or jabr.  Jahm believed that human reason could not 
understand the actions of God, denied the attributes of God, and asserted the 
createdness of the Qur’an.102 The Mu’tazila was one group, which differs 
even in their own opinions, which grew from those ideas that Jahm 
subscribed to.103 However, the Mu’tazila rejected Jahm’s beliefs on 
predestination and embraced the concept of free will.  Al-Baladhuri included 
one report concerning Jahm’s prostylization of the Greeks to his religious 
beliefs in God’s lack of worldly attributes and that human reason cannot 
understand God.104 This report was found after al-Tabari’s report concerning 
Jahm’s involvement with al-Harith’s rebellion and likely speaks to his role in 
supplying religious rhetoric and ideology to this populist movement. 
In addition to al-Harith’s association with Jahm ibn Safwan, there is the 
accusation concerning his general association with polytheists. Al-Tabari 
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102 Ibid., 25:55. 
103 Ibid., 25:56. 
104 Ibid., 25:58. 
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records Nasr ibn Sayyar’s condemnation of al-Harith due to his association 
with “idolators,” or al-mushrikūn.105 While this accusation comes towards the 
end of al-Harith’s life just after he breaks a pact with Nasr ibn Sayyar, his 
association with non-Muslims is documented in numerous passages. The 
straightforward accusation comes at a time when al-Harith is involved in a 
conflict with al-Kirmani, and Nasr is trying to mediate a peace between them. 
After Nasr’s efforts fail and there is even more distrust between the two sides, 
al-Harith, speaking on behalf of his followers, rejects Nasr as leader of prayer. 
Due to the connectedness between the religious and political, al-Harith’s 
rejection of Nasr signaled political ramifications as well as the religious 
rejection of the Umayyad administration and caliphal authority. In response, 
Nasr says, “How should you know [of such things]? You dissipated your life in 
the land of idolatry and raided the Muslims with idolaters!”106  In the Arabic he 
uses the term al-mushrikīn and al-shirk.107 In this Nasr is referring to the 
period of time al-Harith spent in the “country of the Turks” during his exile,108 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVII:35; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:335. 
106 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVII:35; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:335. 
107 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:335; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul 
wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVII:35. 
108 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXVI:235; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:293. 
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as well as his previous exploits, especially those with the Khaqan109 in the 
region of Tukharistan conquering or trying to conquer cities in Khurasan 
under previous governors.110 Nasr’s speech could indicate two aspects of al-
Harith’s heretical ways. First, al-Tabari could be including this text as an 
indication that al-Harith exhibits little knowledge concerning the practice of 
prayer, therefore suggesting a heretical action.111 Second, this line serves to 
demonstrate al-Harith’s association with idolaters as further suggestion of his 
heretical ways.  It is negative associations such as these that signify him as a 
heretic. This accusation of association with polytheists and nonbelievers is 
supported by al-Tabari’s accounts from previous years. One of these 
accounts accuses al-Harith of instigating the attacks from the Khaqan on 
Asad and cities in Khurasan. Al-Tabari recorded Asad saying, “God’s enemy, 
al-Harith ibn Surayj, has brought his tyrant to put out God’s light and change 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 He is described as a rebel Turk, who engaged the governor of Khurasan, 
Asad ibn ‘Abdallah, the Muslims and the Iranians. It appears based on how 
al-Tabari describes the factions that the Turks were not Muslims at this time. 
al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:139; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul 
wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:119. 
110 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:139, 145; al-Tabari, Tārīkh 
al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:119, 122‒123. 
111 This is an important point, since prayer is an important aspect of Islam and 
being considered a Muslim. This definition of a Muslim is blurred since al-
Harith is considered a Murji’ite, who asserts that belief is the only requirement 
to being a Muslim, not practice. Van Ess, “The Origins of Islam: A 
Conversation with the German Islamic Scholar Josef Van Ess.” 
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His religion.”112 Therefore, this quote demonstrates the belief of the governor 
Asad that al-Harith is consciously attempting to overthrow the caliphate and 
alter Islam, which according to Asad, God would not permit.  
 
Al-Tabari’s Perception of al-Harith and his Rebellion 
Al-Tabari’s depiction of al-Harith and his rebellion is not entirely 
negative, even with the inclusion of poetic condemnation for his heretical and 
rebellious ways. This is not completely unexpected, since al-Tabari does not 
mind showing the Umayyads in a negative light. Al-Tabari shows al-Harith in 
a positive light by referring to the supporters of al-Harith, particularly in the 
city of Marw.113 The people of the city supported al-Harith and corresponded 
with him before he went to invade the city. ‘Asim, the governor of Khurasan, 
discovered the correspondence and took several steps to ensure the loyalty 
of his Yamanī soldiers, including bribery, threatening them with Syrian troops, 
and extorting severe oaths from them.114  
In addition to showing the people’s support, al-Tabari employs another 
method to show favor towards al-Harith and his rebellion: mentioning his 
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113 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:106; al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-
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114 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:106‒108; al-Tabari, Tārīkh 
al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 7:94‒96. 
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black banners and black clothes as a foreshadowing of the Abbasid 
revolution. It is extremely unlikely that al-Harith is associated with the Abbasid 
propaganda going on at the time in Khurasan, since al-Tabari separates the 
accounts by topic. However, al-Tabari’s multiple references to his wearing 
black on a day of battle,115 or when he raises the “black banners” on his 
approach to Marw,116 is likely inaccurate, but symbolizes the coming of the 
Abbasid rebellion, of which al-Tabari approved. It was in this same year that 
Abbasid missionaries were being persecuted by Asad ibn ʿAbdallah, the same 
governor that al-Harith faced after his defeat at Marw.117 Therefore, the 
utilization of the black banners and clothes symbolizes the downfall of the 
Umayyads and the coming messianic age through multiple rebellions, but 
should not be confused with the Abbasid revolution itself. Al-Harith’s semi-
successful revolt seems like the forerunner of the Abbasid revolution, as he 
gained territory and partisans, while explicitly challenging the established 
Umayyad caliph on religious grounds.  
While it seems strictly interpreted as a political move, there are several 
clues that his revolt could possibly be interpreted as religious as well. There 
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117 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, T, XXV:112,123; al-Tabari, Tārīkh 
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are several calls by him and his partisans to the Umayyad caliph and 
governors, as well as smaller rulers in the area to return to the sunna of the 
prophet and the Book of God.118 The Umayyad governors name him a heretic 
and there are references to the customs of his people or theirs, as al-Harith 
seems to control or rule multiple cities in the province of Khurasan and later 
Transoxania. Evidence for differing religious beliefs and practices is 
supported with the additional information concerning Jahm ibn Safwan.  
Al-Harith’s revolt also subtly demonstrates the fractures between the 
Umayyad caliphate and its governors and the local populace in Khurasan and 
Transoxania. The best evidence of this is the necessity for the local 
population to swear an oath, so that they may fight alongside the then-
governor ‘Asim, in order to keep Syrian troops out of the region.119 This 
example illuminates an important divergence between the Syrian 
administration and those it rules over. The Umayyads’ preference for Syrian 
troops demonstrates the lack of trust between the two groups, which is 
explicitly stated through their oaths to continue fighting as long as the 
governor remains.  Later, the presence of Syrian troops defending and 
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defeating Marw shows that the needs of the governors to bring in more or 
better trained troops outweighed the desires of the populace.120  
 
Analysis 
Throughout the case study, there have been three references to 
heresy: al-Harith prior to his exile (kufr and nafaqa)121, Jahm ibn Safwan 
(mubtad‘a)122, and the general rebellion in Khurasan (kufr).123 These three 
distinct terms and the context in which they are used elucidate the meaning of 
heresy in Islam on the eve and during the third fitna.  
First, the label of heretic can be utilized in general for any serious 
rebellion that poses a challenge to the legitimacy and security of the 
caliphate. ‘Abd al-Hamid’s letter and the accusation of disbelief against al-
Harith within a poem demonstrate this best. In these two cases, al-Harith and 
Jahm’s desire to pose as a challenger against the religious and political 
authority of the Umayyad caliphate means that they are willing to defy God 
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121 Periphery evidence to this is Yazid ibn Muhallib also being labeled a 
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and his authority on earth. Since the Islamic caliphate represents both a 
religious and political authority, rebellion against the political is automatically 
rebellion against the religious, therefore making any rebellion serious enough 
to garner the attention of the caliphate, a heresy.  
Second, al-Harith is referred to as a hypocrite or nafāq, which is 
associated with his usage and interpretation of the Qur’an and the sunna of 
the Prophet for his own purposes. His heresy in this regard is roughly 
theological, because it alludes to changing or distorting theological principles, 
in order to gain followers. However, al-Harith’s religious association with the 
Murji’a also positions him in opposition to the religious program of the 
Umayyad caliphs. 124 The accusation of Jahm ibn Safwan being a mubtad‘a or 
innovator, is much more concrete. His religious beliefs are starkly different 
from those of the Caliphs of the late Umayyad period, and represent a threat 
to them, since he is advocating not only for predestination and an 
accountability of the caliph to the people, but a form of religious agnosticism, 
which if followed to a logical conclusion questions the position of the Prophet 
Muhammad. Jahm’s innovative religious doctrines speaks more to the 
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for the Fall of the Umayyads,” 91.	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traditional understanding of heretic as opposed to heterodox, than the 
conception of a political uprising, with religious motivations.   
Therefore, were al-Harith and Jahm considered heretics in their own 
time? Since there is much that still is unknown about the two, their rebellion, 
and the motivations behind it, the answer is a tentative yes. Not only are they 
referred to as heretics in the sources, but the little that is known about their 
rebellion, religious beliefs, and religious practices supports this assertion. 
Men of similar background in the same historical contexts have been labeled 
heretics, much like them. Therefore, at least within their own historical 
context, they were heretics. The conclusion will analyze these men outside of 
their specific historical context and within the several models discussed in 
chapter two, to determine what heretical/heterodoxical model best fits an 
early Islamic framework.  
	   134 
Conclusion 
 
By applying the theories concerning Islamic heresy and heterodoxy to 
the case study of al-Harith and Jahm’s rebellion in Khurasan, it becomes 
clear that information from all of these theories of heresy add information 
about the Islamic framing of this issue. Al-Harith and Jahm were considered 
heretics within their historical context for two distinct but related reasons: their 
political rebellion against the Umayyad caliphs, and the caliphs’ political and 
religious authority and also due to their distortion of the Qur’an and the sunna 
of the Prophet, all of which were at odds with the authoritative legitimacy 
claimed by the Umayyad caliphs.1 This paper has found that a combination of 
the theories outlined in chapter one presents the best model for the Islamic 
framework. 
The first issue is the problem of Islamic orthodoxy, which has been 
dated by several scholars at different periods in early Islam. Lewis set the 
orthodoxy during the period of the Prophet Muhammad,2 van Ess originally 
sets it during the Abbasid Empire with the Mu‘tazila,3 while Donner sets 
crystallization of Islamic identity and political orthodoxy under ‘Abd al-Malik (r. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Judd, “The Third Fitna: Orthodoxy, Heresy and Coercion in Late Umayyad 
History,” 282. 
2 Lewis, “Some Observations on the Significance of Heresy in the History of 
Islam,” 46‒47. 
3 Van Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology. 
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66-86/685-705). 4 Each of the scholars also sees resistance to the Umayyads 
differently. With the variety of different opinions and perspectives on this 
issue, it appears the Islamic religion was perpetually changing and therefore, 
the concept of heresy too was continually in flux. Lewis’ framework 
emphasizes the flexibility of the Islamic model as a necessary aspect, which 
he found necessary due to the fracturing of the Islamic community after the 
Abbasids. However, Donner’s theory of political orthodoxy and religious 
identity is utilized, because it focuses on the Umayyad period, a time in which 
the community was unified under one polity, despite the fracturing caused by 
the development of different theological doctrines, tribal rivalries, and political 
strife. 
Chapter four has established that al-Harith and Jahm represented 
cases of heresy in this period, particularly those heretic rebels unassociated 
with the ‘Alids or the Khawārij. The Umayyad caliphs, while lacking the 
political and religious structures to identify and root out heresy in the way the 
Christian Church can, did designate heretics and mete out punishment to 
those who posed a threat to their political and religious legitimacy. Keeping in 
mind the multiple usages of heretic (in its many forms) found within the 
primary sources, the term heretic described a person who rebelled politically 
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and militarily against the caliphate and its governors (kufr), someone who 
used “the Book of God and the sunna of the Prophet” to call people to their 
rebellion, and finally someone who, using reason, innovated (mubtada‘) in 
Islam in a way that differed from the interpretation favored by the Umayyad 
Caliphs and threatened their religious authority.  
A brief explanation of the usability of the frameworks, found in chapter 
one, will now be discussed. The majority of theories, like that of 
Wansbrough’s, insists on a period of co-development between the sects and 
the future religious orthodoxy. Whether the religious orthodoxy is established 
under the Umayyads is debatable. However, it seems clear that whatever the 
status of religious orthodoxy under the Umayyads, it continued to evolve 
under the Abbasids.  
Lewis’s theory, while fitting and appropriate for the case study in this 
paper due to its tractability, presents too vague an answer to be satisfactory. 
Van Ess’ most recent theory concerning Islamic heresy as a refusal of the 
Prophet Muhammad and/or the Qur’an represents a fair interpretation, 
especially when combined with the concept of heterodoxy. Particularly in light 
of alternative case studies, such as Hasan al-Basri, who was able to assert 
divergent religious beliefs, without raising the ire of ‘Abd al-Malik and being 
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executed as a heretic.5 Van Ess’ theory particularly works well in later periods 
when the specific Islamic sects tamper with the religious legitimacy of the 
prophet or reject the Qur’an, and his model does fit in the period presented in 
this study, since the Islamic orthodoxy, as represented by the emphasis on 
the Prophet Muhammad and Qur’an, were recently adopted. MacEoin’s 
theory is also referring to a later period in which once acceptable groups 
deviate further and become heretical groups. This theory is nicely combined 
with van Ess’ qualification for belief in the Prophet Muhammad and the 
Qur’an.  
The last theory to apply to the case study is that of Talal Asad, who 
reviewing the original theory from Nelson, determined that the concept of and 
theory of heresy developed by the Christians were too foreign to be adapted 
to Islam. Therefore, only part of the theory shall be applied to the case study. 
Asad’s major point, which he derived from Nelson’s original article, was that a 
lack of pressure and attention to particular geographical areas on the part of 
the caliphal government created divergence in religious thought and practice, 
exacerbated by a lack of Church presence. This seems to be true in the case 
study, and the Islamic context, despite the fact that some heretics such as 
Ghaylan  al-Dimashqi and al-Harith ibn Sa’id al-Khadhdhab, were active in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Judd, “The Third Fitna: Orthodoxy, Heresy and Coercion in Late Umayyad 
History,” 237. 
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Damascus, the capital of the empire. The Islamic system, as Asad points out, 
lacks the administrative infrastructure that the Christian Church has to 
publicize Church doctrine, discover religious heretics, and summarily punish 
them. Therefore, even in the Umayyad capital of Syria, heresy in terms of 
political/religious opposition to the established authority can be found.   
Consequently, the concept of Islamic heresy at this period works best 
in a heterodoxical framework in which multiple religious sects, with differing 
religious beliefs and practices, all develop their sects at the same time. Those 
parties labeled and killed as heretics represent unacceptable heterodoxical 
groups that threated the political (and religious) authority of the Umayyads by 
trying to usurp power using military brawn or arguments of legitimacy by 
advocating religious programs counter to the interests of the Umayyads.  
However, their adherence to the belief of the Prophet Muhammad and the 
Qur’an make them Muslims. Therefore, while al-Harith represents a heretic to 
the Umayyads, who viewed themselves as the religious orthodoxy, in actuality 
al-Harith ibn Surayj and his following should be considered as a heterdoxical 
sect, against the Umayyads. 
As for Jahm, the claim of heresy within the heterodoxical framework is 
slightly more complex. His religious beliefs require much more study to 
determine whether his rejection of the ability to obtain rational knowledge of 
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God extends to the point of questioning Muhammad’s prophethood. If the 
primary sources support assertions of true agnosticism, then Jahm could fall 
outside the range of Islamic heterodoxy and be considered a heretic in 
Islamic terms. 
  This study is by no means conclusive and should be viewed as an 
introduction to the study of Islam in the pre-modern period and how Islam and 
religious authority continually relate to political power and those that rebel 
against it. Further study is necessary concerning al-Harith ibn Surayj and 
Jahm ibn Safwan in order to come to more conclusive evidence of their own 
“heresies” as well as the heterodoxical nature of early Islamic society. This 
could be done with the inclusion of more primary sources, such as additional 
letters from ‘Abd al-Hamid’s collection regarding Khurasani rebels and two 
other letters regarding fitna in general.6 Other primary resources, including 
more passages from al-Baladhuri and al-Tabari should be examined for 
further historical context and details concerning their religious program and 
rebellion. In addition, Sīrat Sālim and letters from Hasan al-Basri should be 
analyzed to provide extensive context to the development of religious 
doctrines within the Qadariyya and Murji’a.  
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Appendix A:  Poem as Excerpted from al-Tabari’s Tārīkh1 
By: Nasr ibn Sayyar 
 
و قال فيه نصر بن سّيار حين أقبل الحارث إلى َمْرو و سّود 
:و كان الحارث يرى رأى المرجئة -راياته   
 
!ُدنيا َو أَْهالً أَْنَت تاِرُكهمْ َدْع َعنَك   
 ما َخْيُر ُدنَيا وأَْهٍل ال َيُدوُمونا 
َة أياٍم إلى  أَجلإال َبقيَّ  
 فاطلُْب ِمَن ِهللا أهال ال َيُموتونا 
  أكِثر تَقى ِهللا في اإلْسَراِر ُمْجَتِهداً 
َقى َخْيُرهُ ما كان مْكُنونا   إِنَّ التُّ
َتَهنٌ واْعَلم بأَنََّك باألعماِل ُمرْ   
         فكن لذاَك ِكثيَر الَهَم َمْحُزونا
  إنى أََرى الَغَبَن الُمرِدى بصاِحبهِ 
 َمْن كان في هذه األَّياِم َمْغُبونا 
1هُ َتكوُن للَمرِء أَطواراً َفَتمَنحُ  F2 
        وَطْوراً تمنُح الليناَيوماً ِعثاراً 
َحّوَلهُ  الَعيشِ َبينا الَفَتى في نِعِم   
          به َعْن ذاك َمزُبونا َدهر فحسى
ةً َحتَّى ُيَسرَّ ِبَها  تْحلو له َمرَّ
                                                                 
1 Abū Ja’far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, O, 
Second. (Cairo: Dār al-Ma’ārif bi-Miṣr, 1119), 100-101. 
 The preceding note was copied from: Abū Ja’far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr ف <أحياناً> 2




  ِحيناً َو ُتمقُِرهُ َطعماً أحايينا  
هِر َتْنَظرهُ  هل غابٌر ِمْن َبَقايا الدَّ
ونا   إالَّ كما قد مضى فيما ُتَقضُّ
 فاْمنْح جهاَدَك َمْن لم َيْرُج آِخَرةً 
ا لَِقوٍم ال ُيَصلّونا    وكن َعُدوَّ
ا وَناِصَرُهمْ   واقُتْل ُموالَيهُم ِمنَّ
 حيناً تكفُِّرُهْم والَعْنُهُم حينا 
 َوالَعائبيَن علينا ِدنَنا َوُهمُ 
 َشرُّ الِعباِد إِذا خاَبْرَتُهْم ِدينا  
 والقائليَن َسبيُل ِهللا بْغَيُتنا
ا َيقُولونا   َلُبعَد ما نَكُبوا َعمَّ
راً ُمْنَتصِ فاقُتلُهُم َغَضباً ِل   
 ِمنُهم ِبِه َوَدِع الُمرتاب َمْفُتونا 
َقَرنإْرجاُؤُكم لُزُكْم  والشْرَك في    
 فأَنُتُم أَْهُل إِشراٍك َوُمْرُجونا  
  ال يبعِد هللاُ في االُْجداِث َغْيَرُكمُ 
 إذ َكاَن ِدينُكُم بالشِّْرِك َمْقُرونا 
  أَلَقى ِبِه هللاُ ُرعباً في ُنُحوِركمُ 
لَنا الُحْسنى َوُيْعليناوهللاُ َيقِضى    
  َكْيما نُكوَن الُمَوالِى ِعنَد خاِئَفةٍ
ا َتُروُم به اإلِْسالَم والدينا   عمَّ
ا كاِذبين ِبهِ    وَهْل َتعيُبوَن ِمنَّ
         غاٍل َو ُمْهَتِضٍم, َحْسبى الذى فينا
  يأَْبى الذى كاَن ُيْبلي ْهللا أَّوَلُكمْ 




Appendix B: Poem as Excerpted from The History of al-Ṭabarī1 
Translated by: Khalid Yahya Blankinship 
 
Nasr ibn Sayyar said regarding him at the time al-Harith approached Marw 
and raised black banners, al-Harith being of the opinion of the Murji’a: 
 
Leave behind you a worldly life and a family you are going to leave; 
What good is there in a world and a family that do not last, 
Except for a remainder of days to an appointed time?  
Therefore, seek from God a family who do not die. 
Strive after much fear of God regarding secrets: 
The best of fear of God is what is hidden.  
Know that you are hostage to your works; 
 Therefore be much worried, sad. 
I see murderous deceit in the master of he 
Who in these days has been deceived. 
(The world) will be for a man various times; it will make him2 
Stumble one day, and another time it will give him ease, 
While time transforms a youth having a pleasant 
Life, so that he later gets knocked about: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Abū Ja’far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, 
trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship, vol. XXV (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1989), 113‒114. 
2 This line could be more loosely translated as, “(The world) will pose various 




(Life) is sweet to him one time, so that he is pleased with it 
For a while, and becomes bitter in taste for him (other) times. 
Is it a passing moment from the remnants of time which you wait for, 
Other than like that which has elapsed, in which you may carryout (you 
plans)? 
Make your struggle against those who do not hope for an afterlife, 
And be an enemy to a people who do not offer Islamic worship. 
And slay their follower among us and their helper, 
Sometimes declaring them unbelievers, and curse them sometimes, 
And those finding fault with us regarding our religion, who are  
The worst followers of religion if you searched out information from them, 
And those saying, “The path of God is our desire”; 
How far they have deviated from what they say! 
Therefore, slay them in anger for God, triumphing 
Over them by it, and leave the doubter seduced (by the rebelliousness). 
Your delay (of judgment) has pushed you together with polytheism in a 
coupling, 
So that you are a people of polytheism and delayers (of judgment at the same 
time). 




For your religion has been tied to polytheism. 
God has cast fear into your throats because of it, 
While God decrees for us goodness and exalts us, 
So that we may be the helpers, when a fearful event occurs 
Owing to what you are aiming at through polytheism for Islam and the world. 
Do you (people) fault us, lying about it, (saying that We are between) 
extremist and oppressor? What is among us is enough for me! 
He among those of you whom God afflicted first refused3 
(Being afflicted with) hypocrisy, nor did He thus afflict us.4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This line could also be translated, “He among those of you whom God first 
afflicted abstained or refrained (from God).”   
4 This line could be translated more loosely as, “(Being afflicted with) 
hypocrisy, He did not afflict us.” 
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Glossary 
 
Ahl al-Bayt-  Translated as “People of the House,” referring to the family of 
the Prophet 
 
Ahl al-Kitāb-  Translated as “People of the Book,” referring to other religions 
adhering to monotheism, i.e., Christians and Jews 
 
Fitna  (pl. fitnāt) ‒ conflict or discord within the Muslim community, especially 
that between ‘Ali and Mu‘awiya 
 
I jmā ‘ -consensus of the scholars of a particular region as embodying sunna 
practice, by definition exemplary 
 
Ir ja’ ‒  a doctrine advocated by the Murji’a, promoting the deferment to God’s 
will on religious doctrines by suspending judgment in the meantime  
 
Kā f ir-  a heretic or unbeliever  
 
Khurasan-  a province east of the Caspian Sea (see the map on page iv) 
 
Mawlā- ‘client’; a non-Arab who has accepted Islam; a follower of an 
important individual 
  
Mubtada‘-  a person who introduces innovation into the Islamic faith, related 
to the term bid‘a: innovation, the opposite of sunna 
 
Murj i ’a-  a large and diverse theological group that suspended religious 
judgments for God’s  judgment and advocated on behalf of non-Arab converts 
to Islam 
 
Mu‘tazila-  a theological group during the Abbasid Empire who believed in 
the createdness of the Qur’an and utilizing human reason to understand God 
  
Nā f iq-  literally a hypocrite, but also taken to mean a heretic 
 
Qadariyya-  a theological group during the Umayyad Empire who believed in 
free will, the accountability of the caliph to his people, the createdness of the 
Qur‘an 
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Rāshidūn- religio-political leaders who succeeded the Prophet Muhammad, 
including Abu-Bakr, Umar, ‘Uthman, and ‘Ali 
 
Sunna- accepted usage or practice; eventually identified with the sunna of 
the Prophet, the usage of Muhammad which Sunni Islam accepted as being, 
together with the Qur’an, the main source of authority for its law 
 
Transoxania- a province in central Asia, northeast of the Oxus River, north 
of Khurasan or modern day Iran (see map on page iv)  
 
‘Ulama’- the religious scholars of Islam 
 
Umma- the political, social and spiritual community of Muslims 
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